The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal
District Courts and the Transformation of Civil
Rights in Education, 1968-1974
Charles L. Zelden

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law and Race Commons
Recommended Citation
Zelden, Charles L. (1999) "From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District Courts and the
Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974," Akron Law Review: Vol. 32 : Iss. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Zelden: From Rights to Resources

FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES :
THE SOUTHERN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, 1968-1974
by
Charles L. Zelden*

By 1968, the court ordered civil rights “revolution” was at a crossroads. More than
a decade after Brown v. Board of Education1 had called for school desegregation, few
schools were even marginally integrated.2 Southern opposition to desegregation,
combined with a lack of direction from the Supreme Court, had left the lower federal
courts unwilling, or unable, to demand rapid action. Stagnation resulted.3
This situation would change. Seemingly out of nowhere, and in a very short period
of time, the federal courts transformed the concept of civil rights, taking it in a new and
expansive direction almost impossible to predict a mere decade before. Reinterpreting a
mix of government laws, regulations and past judicial orders, the courts, along with
other branches of the federal government, began to reallocate social and economic
resources such as access to education, jobs, political power and housing away from the
majority toward the social margins.4 By 1974, a system of governmnt-ordered, race
and gender-based, redistributive remedies to the problems of the past was in place.5 The
years immediately following saw a maturation of this system. The result transformed
American society and politics as group affiliation, rather than individual worth, became
the defining standard in public life. 6
*

Associate Professor of History, Farquhar Center for Undergraduate Studies, Nova
Southeastern University. A. B., 1985, Washington University; A. M., 1985, Washington
University; Ph. D., 1991, Rice University. The Author would like to thank Paul Finkelman,
Tom Mackey, Scott Stoddart, Les Lindley, Alaric Burns, and Stephen Levitt for their help
and/or comments in preparing this article.
1
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2
J. HARVIE W ILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 101 (1976); Billy G. Bridges, The Forty Year Fight to Desegregate
Public Education in the Fifth Circuit and In Particular Mississippi, 16 M ISS. C. L. REV. 289,
306-07 (1996). For a discussion on compliance with Brown’s order to desegregate among the
school districts that made up the Brown case, see generally RAYMOND W OLTERS, THE BURDEN
OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984).
3
See generally W ILKINSON, supra note 2; W OLTERS, supra note 2.
4
See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY (1990); A NDREW KULL, THE COLOR -BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
5
Kull, supra note 4, at 191.
6
See generally TERRY EASTLAND & W ILLIAM J. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY
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One should not underestimate the impact of this shift in public policy after 1968.
While the civil rights’ movement’s traditional dream of a color-blind Constitution had
often been just that -- a dream -- the formal emphasis prior to 1968 had been on
protecting individual rights through the medium of a generally status-blind access to
law.7 The goal was the implementation of equality through the removal of race as an
issue of public consideration, and most civil rights laws and decisions were formulated
-- at least technically -- to achieve that end.8
The problem, as both civil rights reformers and the courts soon discovered, was that
merely having a “right” to something was not in itself enough to assure equal treatment
under the law. Nor was access to a court of law an adequate remedy if the courts
were unable, or unwilling, to provide adequate solutions to the problems faced by
disadvantaged groups. Rights without effective remedies are meaningless rights, and
that was exactly the situation many Americans found themselves in by 1968.
The source of this disjunction between rights and results was twofold. The first lay
in the problems posed by the opposition to civil rights by many white Americans,
especially, though not solidly, in the South.9 Few in the South accepted the Supreme
Court’s offer in Brown II10 of a voluntary process of desegregation in 1955, and this
position of “massive opposition” to civil rights reforms continued into the 1960s.11 The
law might have been on the side of the plaintiffs in desegregation suits, but the
advantages in the desegregation fight usually lay with the defendant school districts
which had the money, the legal talent and the public backing necessary to place
significant roadblocks in the way of the district judge’s implementation of an effective

FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER (1979); LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY
DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE

AND THE

SCHOOLS , at chs. 5-7 (1976)

(providing a much mo re negative view on this transformation).
7

For a discussion of movement’s formal and judicial advancements, see KULL, supra note
4, at chs. 9-10.
8
RICHARD POLENBERG, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: CLASS, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1938, at 237 (1980).
9
For a discussion on Southern opposition to Brown, see generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY,
THE RISE OF M ASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S
(1969); M ICHAL R. BELKNAP , FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987); J. W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY
M EN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); ROBERT A. PRATT, THE
COLOR OF THEIR SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1954-89, at 6-9 (1992);
FRANK READ AND LUCY M CGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE
DEEP SOUTH (1978).
10
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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desegregation plan (where the judge was willing to take such an action in the first
place).12 The methods used by those opposed to desegregation were simple and
effective: If a case could be won on its merits, then stall the process for as long as
possible. 13 This process was exactly what occurred in most southern districts. And,
as early desegregation suits in Dallas, Atlanta, and New Orleans showed, the result was
that little if any real desegregation had occurred by 1968.14
Of equal importance in minimizing the effectiveness of the early civil rights laws and
decisions were the limits built into the civil rights process by the Supreme Court.15
Most civil rights decisions prior to 1968 focused on the political and social
manifestations of discrimination. As Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in Brown, 16 the
high court viewed “the evil of racial discrimination” as arising out of the feelings of
“inferiority as to their status in the community” generated within the “hearts and minds”
of the African-American.17 It was this sociological effect of segregation, “amply
supported by modern authority,” that mandated the Court’s decision in Brown. 18 “We
conclude,” the Chief Justice had intoned for the unanimous Court, “that in the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal” and thus violative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.19
This approach had the advantage of flexibility. By stopping short “of holding
unconstitutional all racial classifications by government as impermissibly colorconscious per se, . . . the Court was able to maximize its newly claimed authority and
jurisdiction while minimizing limitations on its discretion in enforcing its decree and
affording remedies” in the face of popular opposition.20 Yet “the price of unanimity . .
. was deliberate ambiguity,” and in 1954, unanimity on the Court was deemed essential
if any action on civil rights was to be achieved.21
12

PELTASON, supra note 9, at chs. 3-4 (providing examples of this process).
Id.
14
See, e.g., Bell v. Rippy, 133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955); Bell v. Rippy, 146 F. Supp. 485
(N.D. Tex. 1956); Calhoun v. Members of Bd. of Educ.,188 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ga. 1959);
Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 1 RRLR 306, 308 (E.D. La. 1963).
15
W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 64-68. One of the great ironies of this ambiguity in Brown,
as we shall see, was that it permitted the federal courts to shift within a fifteen year period
from ordering that no student may be assigned to a school because of their race to mandating
the assignment of students based solely on race -- without having to formerly overturn the
Brown “doctrine.” As written, Brown could permit either interpretation. EASTLAND &
BENNETT, supra note 6, at 123.
16
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17
Id. at 494.
18
Id. at 494.
19
Id. at 495.
20
GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 368.
21
Id. at 370; see also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
13

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 2

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

This approach had the disadvantage, however, of ignoring the important economic
sources of discrimination. Poverty, in equal partnership with racism, stood in the way
of blacks’ efforts at improving their lives in the 1960s. As civil rights strategist Bayard
Rustin noted in February 1965:
More Negroes are unemployed today than in 1954, and the unemployment gap
between the races is wider. The median income of Negroes has dropped from 57 per
cent to 54 per cent of that of whites . . . . More Negroes attend de facto segregated
schools today than when the Supreme Court handed down its famous decision. . . .
And behind this is the continuing growth of racial slums, spreading over our central
cities and trapping Negro youth in a milieu which, whatever its legal definition, sows
an unimaginable demoralization . . . These are the facts of life which generate
frustration in the Negro community and challenge the civil rights movement. At
issue, after all, is not civil rights, strictly speaking, but social and economic
conditions.22

The civil rights movement, as shaped by the Brown23 decision’s logic, Rustin
concluded, had only attacked “institutions which [were] relatively peripheral both to the
American socio-economic order and to the fundamental conditions of the Negro
people.”24
This failure to correct the social and economic as well as legal foundations of
discrimination was a primary factor fueling change in civil rights after 1968. The reality
in black lives was that “the residents of Harlem and Watts already enjoyed equality
before the law,” it simply did them little good.25 By the late 1960s, the same could be
said for an African-American in the newly (if technically) desegregating South. Equal
rights under the law were not making a fundamental difference in their actual lives, and
this failure was becoming more and more important to those affected by the twin
burdens of discrimination and poverty.
The primary effect of this expanding gap between rights and results was a growing
pressure from minority communities (first the black and then others) to make effective
the rights promised by the civil rights revolution, to shift the priority in civil rights away
from “equal treatment” toward “equal results.”26 The courts and government, Bayard
Rustin argued, needed to be concerned with “not merely . . . removing the barriers to
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L. REV. 1 (1979).
22
KULL, supra note 4, at 183 (quoting Rustin). For Rustin’s full comments, see Bayard
Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 39 COMMENTARY
25 (1965).
23
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24
KULL, supra note 4, at 183 (quoting Rustin).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 183-91.
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full opportunity but with achieving the fact of equality.”27 Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
then Assistant Secretary of Labor, concurred.28 “[T]he demand of Negro Americans
for full recognition of their civil rights” had been met.29 “A new crisis in race relations
[was] approaching. In this new period the expectations of the Negro Americans will go
beyond civil rights. Being Americans, they will now expect that in the near future equal
opportunities for them as a group will produce roughly equal results, as compared to
other groups.”30
The growth of the Black Power movement in 1966 and 1967 symbolized the
growing frustration within the black community over the gap between rights and
results.31
As Stokely Carmichael noted in an essay entitled “What We Want,”
published in The New York Review of Books in September 1966, “Black Power . . . .
begin[s] with the basic fact that black Americans have two problems: they are poor
and they are black.”32 Any reform that did not solve for these twin evils was doomed
to failure. Sadly, this had been the case with the civil rights movement which had up to
then focused exclusively on issues of race.
[I]ntegration speaks not at all to the problem of poverty, only to the problem of
blackness. . . . Integration, moreover, speaks to the problem of blackness in a despicable
way. As a goal, it has been based on complete acceptance of the fact that in order to
have a decent house or education, blacks must move into a white neighborhood or send
their children to a white school. This reinforces, among both black and white, the idea
that “white” is automatically better and “black” is by definition inferior. This is why
integration is a subterfuge for the maintenance of white supremacy.33

“The reality,” Carmichael concluded “is that this nation, from top to bottom, is
racist.”34 Was it any wonder that each time blacks “saw Martin Luther King get
slapped, they became angry; when they saw four little black girls bombed to death,
they were angrier; and when nothing happened, they were steaming”?35 The civil
rights movement “had nothing to offer . . . [the black community], except to go out and
27

Rustin, supra note 22, at 27.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR , OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL A CTION (1965), reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & W ILLIAM L. YANCY,
THE M OYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39 (1967).
29
Id. at 43.
30
Id.
31
See M ANNING M ARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
IN BLACK A MERICA, 1945-1990, at ch. 5 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the Black Power movement
between 1965 and 1970); POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 231-34.
32
STOKELY CARMICHAEL, What We Want, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (1966),
reprinted in THE A GE OF PROTEST 132 (Walt Anderson, ed., 1969).
33
Id. at 135-36 (emphasis in original).
34
Id. at 140.
35
Id. at 131.
28
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be beaten again.”36 What was needed, if this failure of reform was to be overcome,
was for “[b]lack people . . . to win political power, with the idea of moving on from
there into activity that would have economic effects.”37 Ultimately, “the economic
foundations of this country” had to be “shaken if black people [were] to control their
lives.”38 With real power, “the masses could make or participate in making the
decisions which govern their destinies, and thus create basic change in their day to day
lives.”39 Without power, the evils of discrimination would only continue unchecked.40
Carmichael and others in the Black Power Movement were skeptical that white
society would grant such a redistribution of power and resources to blacks without a
virtual revolution.41 Others in the black community, not to mention other minority
groups, were willing to take the chance. Despite the seeming unwillingness of the
federal district courts to push the civil rights laws into new areas of concern without
the direct order of an appellate court, such requests were still being placed on district
court dockets in ever growing numbers.42 In essence, those who filed such suits
seemed to be saying, ‘meet our needs for equality of results, or face the anger and
revolution represented by the Black Power movement.’
Yet whether the solution proposed involved revolution or reform, one thing was
clear by the summer of 1968: rights without effective remedies could no longer fulfill
the ambitions of the black community. The frustration within this community over this
gap between rights and results was becoming increasingly explosive; in the summers
of 1966 and 1967, and especially following Martin Luther King’s assassination in April
1968, this frustration had finally exploded into violence. 43 In a four year period,
hundreds of cities across the nation were engulfed for days at a time by the flames of
urban unrest.44 Hundreds of thousands of ghetto residents took part in these riots;
60,000 of them were arrested for their actions; 10,000 were seriously injured; about

36

Id.
Id. at 132.
38
Id. at 135.
39
Id. at 132 (emphasis in original).
40
Id.
41
See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION
(1967).
42
Donald Horowitz notes how “[the school desegregation cases] created a magnetic field
around the courts, attracting litigation in areas where judicial intervention had earlier seemed
implausible.” DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 10 (1977). For the
statistics of civil rights filings, see A NNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1960-1968).
43
POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 234.
44
See generally THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL A DVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 35 (1968) (providing numerous examples of urban unrest and violence) [hereinafter
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS]; see also POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 234.
37
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250 were killed.45 Most riots were ended only by the application of massive military
strength; in 1967, 32,000 national guardsmen and regular army soldiers were called out
to suppresses urban riots; in 1968 the number grew to 60,000.46
These race riots had an important transformative effect on the political elite who ran
the country and on their attitudes toward race relations and the problems of civil rights
reform. Those at the top of the social and political hierarchy were deeply shocked by
the scope of the riots. As few events before or since, the race riots “convinced
policymakers at every level that something extraordinary had to be done to improve the
lot of black Americans.”47 They came to believe that traditional civil rights measures
aimed at achieving color-blind access to law as a remedy for the ills of discrimination
simply would not -- could not -- work anymore. The goal of a color-blind constitution
was not abandoned, at least as a constitutional ideal; but events dictated that such
ideals needed to be put off for the sake of social and political harmony.48
The Kerner Commission, formed after the 1967 riots to explore the causes of the
riots, crystallized this new perception into a call for action in its final report published in
1968.49
[T]he development of a small but steadily increasing Negro middle class while
the greater part of the Negro population is stagnating economically is creating a
growing gap between Negroes haves and have-nots.
This gap, as well as the awareness of its existence by those left behind,
undoubtedly adds to the feelings of desperation and anger which breed civil
disorders. Low-income Negroes realize that segregation and lack of job
opportunities have made it possible for only a small proportion of all negroes to
escape poverty and the summer disorders are at least in part a protest against being
left behind and left out . . .
What the American economy of the late 19th and early 20th century was able to
do to help European immigrants escape from poverty is now largely impossible.
New methods of escape must be found for the majority of today’s poor.50

The question, as always, was what “new” methods to use. The traditional methods
associated with fighting poverty -- an expanded commitment to job creation, improved
education and welfare supports -- were costly both in terms of financial and political
capital. To make a real difference in the actual lives of minorities through such
45
46
47
48
49
50

POLENBERG, supra note 8, at 234.
Id.
KULL, supra note 4, at 188.
Id. at 188-89.
See generally COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 44, at 282.
Id.
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methods would require a serious expansion in the government’s commitment to
domestic spending.51 Sadly, with the war in Vietnam consuming larger and larger
segments of the government’s fiscal resources, such a call for a renewed and expanded
war on poverty was unlikely to be funded.52 In addition, the traditional methods were
time consuming. The lag between reform and results could sometimes take a
generation; at its quickest, it still could take years to bring about visible results. This
time frame was too long to wait in the tense days following the riots. As the Kerner
Report concluded following the 1967 riots, “the vital element of time” was no longer
available for long-term solutions.53 Whatever new methods were found to solve the
problems of race and poverty, they would have to be implemented quickly.54
Into this gap strode the federal courts. “In the face of a sudden and universal
conviction that the whole process would cost too much and take too long, it was
inevitable that equality of results would come to be sought by different means.”55
Between the obvious, but unacceptable, alternatives of doing nothing or funding a
massive expansion of welfare programs, lay the compromise of addressing the “results
“ of racism and poverty in minority lives through judicial action.56 This plan had the
advantage of limiting public expenditure by abandoning “the really expensive part of the
traditional prescription -- substantial government intervention to alter the lives of the
truly disadvantaged.”57 At the same time, judicial action offered the advantage of
visible, immediate results, or at least the perception of visible, immediate results -which, given the primary motivation behind this reform of muting minority frustration
with poverty and racism, was an acceptable result to most white policymakers.
The effect, whatever the immediate causes or intended results, was an expanding
commitment within the federal judicial hierarchy to use judicial powers to achieve

51

For an example of the political and practical difficulties associated with traditional
reform methods, see A LAN J. MATUSOW , THE UNRAVELING OF A MERICA: A HISTORY OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S , at 217-21 (1984).
52
KULL, supra note 4, at 188-89; M ATUSOW , supra note 51, at 169-75.
53
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 44, at 281-82.
54
Id. Despite its call for “new methods of escape” and its concerns for the need to act
quickly, the Kerner Commission’s final recommendations for government action were soundly
based in the traditional methods of employment and welfare reform. KULL, supra note 4, at
188-89.
55
KULL, supra note 4, at 189.
56
It should be noted that a second alternative solution existed in the form of enhanced
administrative reform carried out by the federal executive bureaucracy. Along with the
solution offered by the federal courts, the administrative response would carry the load for
civil rights reform after 1968. The description of this response is beyond the scope of this
article. For a detailed and insightful description of the bureaucratic response, see generally
GRAHAM, supra note 4.
57
KULL, supra note 4, at 188-89.
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“equality of results” in civil rights matters.58 In a series of sweeping decisions, often in
the face of public distrust and opposition, and with seemingly little visible concern for
the long-term effects of their actions, the federal courts once again stepped in where
others chose not to act. Centering their initial efforts on education, but soon moving on
to such topics as jobs, prison conditions and political rights, these courts began to
restructure American society.59 Surprisingly, given their initial unwillingness to demand
significant structural change following Brown, 60 but perhaps understandable given the
tense context of the day, they chose to do this through the medium of race-based
reallocation of resources -- what Andrew Kull has dubbed “benign racial sorting” and
Hugh David Graham the “compensatory theory of preferential discrimination.”61
The effect of this shift in Civil Rights enforcement priorities away from the
individual toward the group -- and from color-blind nondiscrimination to preferential
(i.e. color-based) discrimination -- was explosive. 62 The concept that an individual had
valid claims on the public realm for enhanced access to social, economic and political
resources based not only on their own personal merits, but also on their group
affiliations, produced a radical re-orientation in American law and in the way most
Americans lived their everyday lives.63 Suddenly, one’s standing in the community
depended as much on one’s membership in a particular sub-group of the society as
their own skills, morals and actions.64 As applied by the federal courts, those long on
58

See generally DAVID J. A RMOR , FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
(1995).
59
For a good summary of the changes brought by court order after 1968, see GRAHAM,
supra note 4, at 375-85. For educational reform, compare W ILKINSON, supra note 2, with
GRAGLIA, supra note 6 (Gragllia gives a more negative view of education reform). On job
discrimination see, HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
A FFIRMATIVE A CTION (1991). For prison reform, see BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS
UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS (1991); LARRY W.
YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET : THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
A LABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989). On voting rights, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS A CT , 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds.
1994); A BIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, W HOSE VOTES COUNT ? A FFIRMATIVE A CTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS (1987).
60
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61
GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 370; KULL, supra note 4, at ch. 11 (chapter entitled “Benign
Racial Sorting”).
62
Large numbers of studies exploring the impact of the post-Brown civil rights revolution
on American society have been published. Evaluations have varied as to whether the
changes have been positive or negative, however, all agree that the effects were both
significant and long lasting. See generally A RMOR , supra note 58; EASTLAND & BENNETT,
supra note 6; NATHAN GLAZER, A FFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (Harvard University Press, 1987); GRAGLIA, supra note 6; W OLTERS, supra note 2.
63
See supra note 62.
64
See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING A FFIRMATIVE A CTION: THE CASE FOR
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the outside of American life could now successfully make demands on the government,
the courts and society as a whole, for enhanced access to schools, jobs, or other
rights.65 This meant a whole new way of doing business not only for the government,
but for all Americans.66 The ramifications of this shift have been felt to the present.
The point here is not whether the shift to group-based remedies in civil rights was a
good or a bad thing for the nation. Judgements as to the proper standards and
methods for distributing social, economic and political resources across the many
segments of the nation are a matter of personal interpretation and conscience. Strong
arguments for or against group-based remedies can be, and have been, made by many
commentators and critics.67 What is significant here is that it was the federal courts
which chose to act in these matters and, largely on their own, initiate a policy shift of
such magnitude. That they chose to act in this particular sweeping manner -- that they
chose to act at all -- is both surprising and ironic given the federal courts prior
history.68
It is even more surprising and ironic that much of the construction of this shift lay
within the district courts. The vast majority of federal district judges were white,
upper-class members of the power elite of this nation.69 Most, even where they were
not segregationist or racist, questioned their role in civil rights matters.70 As they saw
it, their job as federal district judges was primarily focused on economic matters and
concerns. Protecting property, and promoting economic expansion so more people

COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996).
65
GRAHAM, supra note 4; KULL, supra note 4, at ch. 11.
66
See generally Graham, supra note 4; KULL, supra note 4, at ch. 11.
67
For critiques of preferential discrimination, see A RMOR , supra note 58; KIRSTIN
BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1988);
EASTLAND, supra note 64; EASTLAND & BENNETT, supra note 6; GRAGLIA, supra note 6. For
positive descriptions of this process, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE M AJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); DEREK BOK & W ILLIAM G.
BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY A DMISSIONS (1998).
68
On the federal court’s relationship, or lack of relationship, to matters of civil rights and
liberties prior to Brown, see JOHN BREMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1988). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
69
See ROBERT CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 97-99 (1985); see
generally Kermit Hall, The Children of the Cabins: The Lower Federal Judiciary,
Modernization, and the Political Culture, 1789-1899, 75 NW . U. L. REV. 423 (1980); SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES : LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH
REAGAN 58-59, 104-5, 147-9, 189-91, 227-9, 276-8, 338-40 (1997). On the makeup of the federal
bench as a whole, see BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES , JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.1983).
70
See generally PELTASON, supra note 9.
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could own private property was their priority.71 For years these judges had
procrastinated in enforcing the mild changes called for by Brown. 72 Now, suddenly,
under the prompting of the Supreme Court, they would take the lead in transforming the
very foundations of our society.
And take a lead they did. For while the goal of producing visible results in civil
rights matters came quickly, as did the commitment in the appellate courts to extreme
solutions, the application of status-based methods of enforcement would come
piecemeal out of the district courts in response to enforcement difficulties in integration
and other civil rights cases. Making an affirmative commitment to promote racial
mixing in the schools or on the job was one thing, pulling it off in practice was another
thing entirely.
It was in response to the practical difficulties in complying with
Supreme Court directives to promote immediate integration that a model for a system of
group-based remedies was found and applied. This model, based in large part on
enforcement tools found in the federal court’s traditional economic caseload and
powers, and adopted by most district judges in integration matters, provided the district
courts with a familiar set of procedures capable of satisfying the Supreme Court’s
demands for immediate action and the minority community’s demand for visible results.
Such compliance came with a price, however. For implicit within the business
enforcement model lay a commitment to group-based remedies. In fact, once the basic
components of this model was adopted, the shift to a group-based, results oriented
jurisprudence was, if not inevitable, hard to stop. In this regard, education cases in the
distric t courts, with their many practical enforcement problems, served as a proving
ground for subsequent reorientations of American society though judicial ordered
reforms.
1. The Supreme Court (Finally) Speaks: The Shift From Desegregation to Integration
71

The above view of the lower federal judiciary is the conclusion of a larger study being
conducted by the author. Complete citations of this trend are beyond the scope of this
article. However, for a general view of the district bench and their attitudes toward their role
as judges, see generally TONY FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
BUSINESS IN A MERICAN HISTORY (1979); TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE, THE SWIFT
AND ERIE CASES IN A MERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR ., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL A MERICA, 1870-1958 (1992);
CHARLES ZELDEN, JUSTICE LIES IN THE DISTRICT : THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT , SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS , 1902-1960 (1993).
O
n
the nature and content of district court caseloads, see A NNUAL REPORT OF THE A TTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1870-1939); A NNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
A DMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1940-PRESENT ); see also David S.
Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in
the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981).
72
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally A NTHONY LEWIS,
PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND A MERICAN REVOLUTION (1964); PELTASON, supra note 9;
J. W ILKINSON, supra note 2.
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The shift toward race-based civil rights in education began quickly in the tense days
following the start of urban unrest. It began at the middle level of the judicial pyramid,
the Circuit Courts of Appeals, which voiced for the first time the federal court’s
growing commitment to equality of results.73 The initiative then moved up the judicial
ladder to the Supreme Court -- which soon expanded upon the circuit court’s approach,
creating in the process a mandate for immediate action in school desegregation
matters.74 Concurrently, questions of enforcement were returned to the district courts,
which faced the many problems of implementing in the real world context the policies
handed down from above. Enforcement problems, in turn, forced district judges to
produce innovative solutions to meeting the problems of race. The Supreme Court’s
subsequent response to these solutions then generated new and expansive civil rights
policies, which once again generated new enforcement problems. And so the pattern
went on and on, until, unexpectedly and largely unintentionally, a revolution in civil
rights law in education occurred.
In just over a single year, in four cases 75 authored by Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor
Wisdom, the concept that any “classification based on race is inherently discriminatory
and violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”76 was
replaced by the understanding that “the only adequate redress for a previously overt
system-wide policy of segregation directed against Negroes as a collective entity is a
system-wide policy of integration.”77 In practical terms, this shift in emphasis created a
positive duty on the part of school boards to officially classify students in regards to
their race as a means to integrate their schools at all costs. “The time has come for
foot-dragging public school boards to move with clarity toward desegregation,” Judge
Wisdom decreed.78 The sole question needing to be resolved in school cases was “how
far have formerly de jure segregated schools progressed in performing their affirmative
constitutional duty to furnish equal educational opportunities to all public school

73

See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965)
(hereinafter Singleton I); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1966) (hereinafter Singleton II); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub. nom., Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840
(1967) (hereinafter Jefferson I); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub. nom., Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840
(1967) (hereinafter Jefferson II).
74
See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
75
See supra note 73.
76
Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm’n, 168 F. Supp. 149, at 151 (E.D. La, 1958) (Judge
Wisdom writing for a three-judge court).
77
Jefferson I, 372 F. 2d at 836, 869 (emphasis in original).
78
Singleton I, 348 F.2d at 729.
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children?”79 The only acceptable answer to this question, in turn, was a “school
desegregation plan. . . that works.”80 And, in Judge Wisdom’s view, any plan that did
not completely eradicate the existing dual-system of education was an inadequate
answer; “Faculties, facilities and activities as well as student bodies must be
integrated.”81
These four circuit court cases,82 which have been called “the most important
doctrinal change[s] in interpretation” of integration, “since Brown itself,”83 lay the
groundwork for the Supreme Court’s adoption of integration as the primary goal in
school cases in Green v. County School Board. 84 The Green85 case arose out of a fact
situation which perfectly exemplified the post-Brown86 failures of desegregation.87
New Kent County, a small rural county in eastern Virginia with very little residential
segregation and its student population almost evenly divided between white and black,
had two schools.88 Prior to Brown, 89 the school on the east side of the county had
been exclusively for whites, while that on the west was for blacks.90 Following Brown,
this racial split continued almost unchecked. In 1965, a freedom-of-choice
desegregation plan was imposed by the Eastern District of Virginia. 91 However, under
this plan, no white students had ever chosen to attend the black school, and only 15 per
cent of the district’s black students transferred to the formerly all-white school. 92
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice William Brennen found against the school
district.93 The “pattern of separate ‘white’ and ‘Negro’ schools in the New Kent
County school system established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the
pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed, and
which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro school children equal
protection of the laws,” wrote Brennen.94 The 1965 desegregation plan had not

79

Jefferson I, 372 F.2d at 896.
Id. at 847.
81
Id. at 868.
82
See supra note 73.
83
Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 20 (1975).
84
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
85
Id.
86
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87
See Green, 391 U.S. at 435, 437-40.
88
Id. at 432.
89
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90
Green, 391 U.S. at 432.
91
Id. at 433-34.
92
Id. at 441.
93
Id. at 441-42.
94
Id. at 435.
80
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worked. The token desegregation of the past, which the Justice noted was only a first
step in the creation of unitary, nonracial education system for all students, was not
adequate to meet the dictates of Brown. 95 School authorities had “the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”; the courts, in turn, had the
affirmative duty to force this end where necessary.96 The time for bold action had
come, Brennen argued.97 “The burden on a school board today,” he wrote, “is to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now.”98 Anything less was unacceptable.
Brennen’s point was clear; effectiveness in achieving integration, judged largely in
terms of numbers, was to be the new standard to be used in desegregation cases.
Applying this new standard to the facts of the case in Green, 99 the Supreme Court ruled
that “‘[f]reedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a
constitutionally required end -- the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects.
If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other
means must be used to achieve this end.”100 Given the lack of effective integration in
New Kent County, new methods were clearly called for.101
The High Court therefore remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit, expecting (or
perhaps simply hoping) that the point had now been made and enforcement of
immediate integration could be left in the hands of the district and circuit courts. The
judges of these lower courts, however, had trouble believing that the Supreme Court
meant exactly what it said in Green. Though they were to set about enforcing the
Supreme Court’s dictates in these matters, they modified the meaning of “immediate” to
minimize the disruptions which integration could bring to the education process.102 Yet
the Supreme Court was unwilling to brook any modifications of its Green103 order.104
Thus, one year after its decision in Green, 105 in response not only to the willingness of
the lower federal courts to accept delays in integration, but to the growing opposition to
immediate integration by state school officials and within the federal executive branch,

95

Id.
Id. at 437-38.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 439.
100
Id. at 440 (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F. 2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Sobeloff, J., concurring)).
101
Id. at 441-42.
102
See W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 118-20.
103
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
104
W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 120.
105
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
96

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/2

14

Zelden: From Rights to Resources

1999]
FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES
the Supreme Court made even more explicit its commitment to this end.106 In two
separate cases, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education107 and Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish, 108 the Supreme Court issued peremptory orders mandating immediate
integration as the only proper response to continuing educational segregation, even
when this entailed the relocation of hundreds of thousands of school children in the
middle of the school year. In Alexander, an appeal from the Fifth Circuit which had
bowed to political pressure to delay the integration of some thirty school districts in
Mississippi, the Court held that “[T]he Court of Appeals should have denied all motions
for additional time, . . . . Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and
hereafter only unitary schools.”109 Carter, 110 which arose from the Fifth Circuit’s
continued disbelief that the Supreme Court really meant what it said, was as emphatic
an order as the High Court made: on appeal, the Court peremptorily reversed the Fifth
Circuit with the comment to get on with the job at hand.111
In the years to come, the Supreme Court would expand and contract on the reach of
the doctrine of immediate and massive integration.112 But, as far as the district courts
were concerned the call to arms had been made. Like it or not, the focus had shifted in
educational civil rights. Desegregation was not enough; the new goal was integration,
and integration now.
2. New Burdens, Old Problems: Enforcing Integration in the Southern District Courts
The effect of this shift in the views of the federal judiciary’s appellate policy-makers
placed a new and heavy burden on the district courts. It was a different burden, however,
than the burden created by Brown.113 The burden of Brown114 grew out of the lack of
direction given the district judge by appellate courts.115 Brown II,116 which had ordered
106

For more on the growing frustration of Supreme Court with delays brought on by state
opposition to immediate integration, see W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 120. For a different read
on the Supreme Court’s mind set in these matters, but one that agrees that the High Court
was in a mood to demand action, see GRAGLIA, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
107
396 U.S. 19 (1969).
108
396 U.S. 290 (1970).
109
Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20.
110
396 U.S. 290 (1970).
111
Id. For a description of the politics behind Alexander and Carter, see READ &
M CGOUGH, supra note 9, at ch. 13; GEORGE R. M ETCALF , FROM LITTLE ROCK TO BOSTON: THE
HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, at chs. 4-5 (1983).
112
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. Denver
Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Millikan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
113
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114
Id.
115
Judge Frank Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama argued that the implementation
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desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” placed the primary responsibility for
implementing this desegregation with the district courts and then left these courts
exposed to the resulting anger and frustrations of a community undergoing change. As
J. Harvie Wilkinson put it, “Brown II . . . resembled nothing more than an order for the
infantry to assault segregation without the prospects of air or artillery support.”117 Add
to this fact that most of the infantry not only lacked enthusiasm for the job in the first
place but disputed their very roles as infantry in these matters, and it should not be
surprising that given a choice between bold action and procrastination, most federal
district judges chose the latter path.118
The Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Jefferson and Singleton and the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Green, Alexander and Carter lifted the district judges’ burden of isolation.
The choice in desegregation suits had been taken out of the hands of district judges.
Their job was to desegregate dual school districts through the method of immediate
integration. No excuses would be accepted; no delays tolerated; and where necessary,
the blame could be placed on the Supreme Court.
The Green decision meant that district judges could no longer ignore the demands
for action made by plaintiffs in school desegregation cases. Yet, despite the explicitness
of the new policy, many problems still remained. Green’s dismissal of the freedom-ofchoice plan in New Kent raised the first problem. If a freedom-of-choice plan that had
a fifteen per cent success rate (which was about as successful an integration ratio as
could be found in the South) was not adequate enough to meet the burden of Brown, 119
what was? 120 How much actual integration had to take place before the new standards
were achieved? Secondly, and more importantly, what methods should the district
courts use to achieve this end? In a footnote to Green the High Court suggested two

order in Brown II was inherently flawed. “That second decision was very, very general and
said district courts should do it with deliberate speed. If they’d said, ‘you’re to start within
one year with the first grade and add one grade each year,’ it would have all been done in
twelve years.” JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M.
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 273 (1993) (quoting Judge Johnson).
Political scientist J. W. Peltason agreed with this view noting that “[district] judges . . . do
what they must . . . [but] they can hardly be expected on their own initiative to move against
the local power structure. If their instructions from above are ambiguous, the ambiguity will
be resolved to conform to the judge’s own convictions and the mo res of his district.”
PELTASON, supra note 9, at 12-13.
116
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
117
W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 81.
118
For other examples of district judge discomfort with the job of ordering desegregation,
see generally PELTASON, supra note 9.
119
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120
For a discussion of the numbers game in Green and its implications for other districts
across the South, see W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 115-17.
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such methods as consolidating one white and one black school together -- “one site . . .
serving grades 1-7 and the other . . . serving grades 8-12” -- and geographical zoning - with students attending integrated neighborhood schools.121 Yet New Kent was a
rural county with a relatively little residential segregation.122 What methods would be
required to achieve integration in urban areas where residential segregation made such
neighborhood based plans inadequate to meet the remedies required by Green? How far
would the district courts have to go in promoting “integration now?”
It was in facing these problems that the new burden on district judges was
created.123 Far from being an easy process, immediate integration proved to be a
difficult endeavor, one that required constant effort and innovation on the part of the
district courts. Further, even where the district courts proved innovative in finding
solutions, the practical and procedural problems of integration often stood in the way of
effective reform.
Consider the problem of white flight. Prodded by the Fifth Circuit, district judges
throughout the South began to order the immediate integration of de jure segregated
school districts.124 The result, by 1971, was to make the South into the most integrated
section in the nation.125 Reaction against this integration was swift, however. In
Mississippi, for example, white enrollment in those counties affected by court ordered
integration dropped twenty-five percent between 1968 and 1970.126 Some districts saw
a ninety percent, and in one case, a one hundred percent drop in white enrollment.127
In Clarendon County South Carolina, one of the five original school districts in Brown,
ninety-nine percent of district’s white students transferred to a private, Baptist parochial
school following a post-Green integration order.128 The result, despite the federal
courts best efforts to achieve the explicit intent of Green (integration), was that many
black students remained in segregated schools, while in other cases, the percentage of
121

Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 n.6. (1968).
KULL, supra note 4, at 194.
123
It should be noted that this burden was shared by the judges of the Fifth Circuit who,
through appeals from the decisions of the district courts, heard over 166 desegregation cases.
If anything, between December 1969 and September 1970, the burden on the judges of the
Fifth Circuit was greater than that on any of the individual district judges who they were
directing in these cases. On the workload of the Fifth Circuit, see Read, supra note 83, at 32
n.108.
124
A summary listing of court orders to implement immediate integration following Green
can be found in 2 LEON JONES , FROM BROWN TO BOSTON: DESEGREGATION IN EDUCATION, 19541974, at 1730 (1979).
125
HEW estimates placed 44 percent of black pupils in majority white schools in the South
by 1971 as compared to only 28 percent in the North and West. 118 CONG. REC. 564 (daily ed.
Jan. 20, 1972) (statement of Sen. Stennis).
126
W ILKINSON, supra note 2, at 121.
127
Id.
128
W OLTERS, supra note 2, at 165.
122
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Integration also proved to be a time consuming and complex process, the effects of
which raised new problems for the district courts. Final solutions in a desegregation
suit were little more than a hope. Often, by the time a district judge solved one
problem, two new problems needing innovative solutions arose. The solutions to these
problems, in turn, generated even more difficulties that needed to be solved. Such
cases dragged on for years on a court’s docket. Often, shifts in Supreme Court policy
negated the solutions reached on the district level, or at the very least, promoted new
appeals whose resolution put off, yet again, the ultimate conclusion of the case. 129 All
this action was dependant, of course, on the willingness of the district judge to be
innovative.
The nature and scope of the problems posed by enforcement of integration -- and
some of the solutions attempted -- can be seen through the example of United States v.
Texas. 130 The origins of United States v. Texas131 lay deep in East Texas where, more
than a decade after Brown, 132 segregated schools were still the norm.133 The case
initially involved two neighboring school districts, Daingerfield ISD and Cason ISD.
Daingerfield’s student population was mostly white; Cason’s was predominantly
black.134 For years, the Daingerfield schools had accepted transfers of white students
from the Cason ISD. 135 In 1968, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s
Office for Civil Rights informed Daingerfield school administrators that these transfers
were in violation of the civil rights laws (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and
decisions of the Supreme Court.136 They ordered the school to stop accepting
transfers.137 The district did so.138 Subsequently, white citizens in Cason responded
by petitioning the state government to detach the white portions of Cason and annex it
129

A clear example of these events can be found in Green v. County School Board, 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
130
The most important of these decisions are: United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043
(E.D. Tex. 1970), supplemented by 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), aff’d as modified, 447 F.2d 441
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971); United States v. Texas, 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D.
Tex. 1971), aff’d, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Texas, 356 F.Supp. 469 (E.D. Tex.
1972), aff’d, 495 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1974); see also FRANK R. KEMERER, WILLIAM W AYNE
JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1991); POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT , SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN TEXAS : THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES V. STATE OF TEXAS (1982).
131
321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
132
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 118.
134
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1046.
135
Id. at 1048.
136
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 117; see also United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 104850.
137
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 117.
138
Id.
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to Daingerfield, which the state did.139 The resulting expanded school district split the
Cason ISD in half.140 This meant that black Cason students had to be bused across
Daingerfield school district lines to go to school. 141 Such busing across district lines
was contrary to Texas state law.142 It was also in direct violation of federal civil rights
laws.143
Investigating further, HEW officials soon found other examples of segregation
though the medium of split white/black majority districts.144 A number of these
districts experienced similar boundary changes “which resulted in the removal of all, or
virtually all, white children from the now all-black districts and the siphoning off of
black students from neighboring districts with bi-racial enrollments.”145 Since many of
these schools received no federal funds (and under Title VI, HEW’s sole weapon
against segregated schools was the termination of federal aid) the matter was referred
to the Justice Department.146
Attorney’s in that department’s Civil Rights Division soon found even more
examples of a dual school systems contiguous with largely white districts throughout
Texas.147
In most cases, these all-black districts lacked the resources of white
districts.148 One such district, the all-black Jeddo District in Bastrop County outside of
Austin, consisted of a one-room schoolhouse with two outhouses located on a remote
dirt crossroad.149 The District employed one teacher and a teacher’s aid.150 Average
attendance was fifteen students, the minimum required under state law to receive state
financial aid.151 And, in order to meet this number, three black students were bussed
from the neighboring all-white Smithfield ISD. 152
Convinced that a case by case approach would prove inadequate to meet the scope
of the problem (not to mention take almost forever to litigate) Justice Department

139

Id.
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 118.
145
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
146
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 117.
147
Id. at 118.
148
Id.
149
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1050.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. (noting that of the nine all-black school districts that ultimately were included in
the case, all but three had less than one hundred students); see also KEMERER, supra note
130, at 118.
140
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lawyers sought to combine these cases into a single action.153 They achieved this
combination through the simple expedient of including both the State of Texas and the
Texas Education Agency (TEA) in the complaint along with the offending school
districts and associated school officials.154 The complaint, filed in March 1970,
justified this inclusion by arguing that the present system of inferior all-black school
districts adjoining predominantly white school districts was the result of state action or
inaction -- a violation of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In particular, it argued that “the state of Texas, through the Texas
Education Agency, ha[d] failed, as the chief supervisory body of public education in
Texas . . . adequately to oversee and supervise the districts within the State so that no
child [was] denied on the grounds of race the benefits of programs supported by
federal funds.”155
This approach had the advantage of allowing the district judge to place the entire
state education system under court order and thus facilitate a state-wide remedy. The
question was, would the district judge accept this consolidated approach? The Justice
Department’s proposal was still a novel concept in 1970. Most prior desegregation
suits had been limited to only a handful of school districts at most.156 Few complaints
had included state education agencies. Only a couple of recent decisions had included
the state education system as a whole. 157 Further, this approach raised jurisdictional
problems. Texas had four federal districts courts. The schools named in this suit (not
to mention other school districts not named but included by virtue of the state’s
inclusion in this case) were spread out across all four districts. Tradition argued for the
independence of individual district courts.158 For one judge to assume authority over
matters in another district was unprecedented. To do so in three other districts was
unthinkable. Yet assuming authority was exactly what the plaintiffs asked the court to
attempt.159
Cognizant of the unique nature of their request, Justice Department lawyers had
searched carefully for an appropriate district in which to file their case. Their choice
was the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas. They chose to file in this
court for two related reasons. First, this particular division had only one judge
presiding, which meant that they knew exactly who the judge hearing the case would
153

Id.
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1045.
155
Id. at 1045-46.
156
See generally JONES , supra note 124, at 1069 (providing abstracts of most
desegregation judgements in education and showing examples of how most desegregation
suits prior to 1970 were limited to a single school district).
157
E.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (combining
sixty-two Alabama school districts under a single class action desegregation order).
158
See CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 69, at 25.
159
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
154
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be. 160 Second, that judge was William Wayne Justice, a liberal Johnson appointee
known both for his pro-integration views and his willingness to apply extensively the
powers of his court.161
It was a good choice on the plaintiff’s part. Justice took civil rights problems, and
the role of his court in providing solutions to those problems, very seriously.162 In a
1969 desegregation case, United States v. Tatum ISD, 163 filed soon after the judge took
to the bench, Judge Justice had acted quickly when the Tatum school board suddenly
backed out of an HEW approved integration plan. Within a week of the case being filed
in his court, the judge produced and ordered implementation a new integration plan, one
in complete compliance with the Green doctrine. 164 At a time when most district judges
were still dragging their feet in desegregation matters, Justice’s work was fast.
Similarly, when a Nixon Administration policy shift away from supporting schoolconsolidation remedies in desegregation suits threatened the entire strategy of the
Justice Department lawyers in United States v. Texas, 165 the judge would “order” these
lawyers to continue with their present strategy (“though he understood, of course, that
they would have represent whatever position the Justice Department approved”).166
160

Most federal district courts are divided into separate divisions, each division holding
court in a different city in the district. Usually, a district judge is assigned to be the resident
judge in one of these division courts (though he can and often does hear cases in any of the
other divisions in the district). Where more than one judge is assigned to a division, cases
are divided up among the sitting judges randomly. This means that were only one judge is
assigned to a division, that judge will hear all of the cases filed in that division, but where
more than one judge sits, that judge will hear only a portion of the cases filed. Needless to
say, litigants who want to know exactly which judge will hear their case will tend to seek out
divisions with only a single judge assigned.
161
On Justice’s background and judicial/political views, see KEMERER, supra note 130.
162
“The law is full of interstices” Judge Justice noted in a 1978 interview. Laura
Richardson & Jo Clifton, William Wayne Justice: An Interview, TEXAS OBSERVER, January 20,
1978, at 5.
If the law is settled -- I’m a professional -- I’m going to decide the case just exactly
the way the law reads. On the other hand, if there is some vacancy or gap, I try to
take into consideration what the Supreme Court has said about ‘the evolving
standards of decency.’ I think the law ought to be decent if it’s nothing else. It
ought to afford justice.
Id. This commitment to ‘affording justice’ made Judge Justice an exceptionally activist judge,
one who -- on par with Judge Johnson of Alabama -- “was quite willing, even desirous, of
doing what was right” for the plaintiff in a civil rights case. KEMERER, supra note 130, at 152
(quoting Peter Sandmann, plaintiffs’ attorney in Morales v. Turman, 326 F. Supp. 667 (E. D.
Tex. 1971)).
163
306 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
164
Id. at 287-88.
165
321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
166
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 119 (quoting Justice Department Lawyer, Alexander
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Given this commitment to enforcing the Supreme Court’s civil rights orders, the
judge’s decision in United States v. Texas came fully down on the side of the plaintiffs.
Testimony at the trial, the judge ruled, fully established the disparate and segregated
nature of the defendant school districts.167 Boundary changes, liberal student transfers
policies and state support of small school districts had all resulted in “isolating racially
homogeneous residential areas into formal political enclaves,” entrenching existing
patterns of segregation, and thus “insur[ing] its continuation after its legal basis was
declared unconstitutional.”168 The result was the creation of dual school systems in
violation of federal law.169
Citing both Brown II’s170 mandate to the federal district courts to oversee the
desegregation of dual school districts and Green’s171 affirmative duty to take all steps
necessary to eliminate racial discrimination “root and branch,” Justice then took up the
challenge posed by the plaintiff’s initial complaint and fashioned a broad remedy
designed to bring about state-wide integration.172 He achieved this end in two parts.
First Justice ordered those school districts named in the original suit to collaborate with
the TEA and the U.S. Office of Education to produce an integration plan that would
assure both faculty and staff desegregation and the non-discriminatory assignment of
students.173 The judge then went on to place the primary responsibility for assuring
school desegregation in all Texas school districts with the TEA. 174 He did this in part
because of the expertise possessed by the agency, an expertise “this court did not
posses.”175 But even more so, the judge placed this burden on the TEA because of the
agency’s past support of segregated dual school districts.176 In essence, Justice sought
to use the TEA to reform a situation it helped create and which only it, in large measure,
could end. The TEA was therefore ordered to immediately halt all discriminatory interdistrict transfer of students and district boundary changes.177 Thereafter, the agency
was ordered to work with HEW’s office of education to reevaluate its policies.178

Buek).
167

United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. at 1051.
Id. at 1050-51.
169
Id. at 1052.
170
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
171
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
172
United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1971).
173
Id.
174
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1056-57 (E.D. Tex 1970).
175
Id. at 1057.
176
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 119.
177
United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d at 442-49.
178
In all, Judge Justice specified eight areas of responsibility for the TEA: (1) to review
and deny all transfer requests that fostered segregation; (2) to investigate school boundary
changes for racial impact; (3) to examine annually school transportation routes to determine if
168
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The judge made this ruling despite the fact that the TEA, though formally charged
with overseeing the state’s public school system, was in practice less a regulatory
agency than an oversight committee facilitating local control over education (and thus
had no real authority or power to desegregate the public schools).179 Having facilitated
both the creation and continued existence of an unconstitutional dual school system
whatever its actual powers, the judge held the burden to desegregate the Texas schools
was squarely on the back of the TEA. 180
The use of the TEA as an enforcement arm of the court proved to be a fateful
choice in terms of achieving substantial integration. The TEA did not want the job. Its
primary constituency lay with the offending school districts, and they strongly opposed
the Court’s order.181 Left alone, the TEA would never have chosen to promote
integration; yet refusing to enforce the Court’s order meant facing significant penalties.
The result was lip-service by the TEA in favor of the order, while a steady pattern of
delay and minor obstructionism undermined its effectiveness.182
Take, for example, the order requiring the TEA to monitor all districts with a
minority enrollment of 66 percent or greater.183 In most years this meant some 200
school districts scattered across the state. 184 As per the judge’s order, the Technical
Assistance Division of the TEA dutifully checked each of these 200 schools.
Considerable staff time and resources were spent on these annual studies, yet little good
came of all this effort. Many of the 200 school districts were in effect unitary districts,
with the students attending one school for any grade level or set of grades levels.185
Others had such a large minority population as to make effective integration impossible
without consolidation of school districts -- a remedy strongly opposed by the rural
nature of these districts.186 Still others were under separate court order, effectively out

they were discriminatory; (4) to evaluate extra-curricular activities for discriminatory bias; (5)
to report discriminatory personnel practices to the commissioner of education; (6) to review
annually those districts maintaining campuses with over 66 percent minority enrollment and
to determine if those schools were in compliance with federal regulations; (7) to conduct a
study of minority student needs; (8) to inform the faculty and staff of grievance and
complaint procedures. Id. at 442-49.
179
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 128.
180
United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235, 249-50 (E.D. Tex. 1971); KEMERER, supra note
130, at 121.
181
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 121.
182
Id. at 128.
183
Id. at 129.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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of the reach of the TEA. 187 In other words, of the 200 districts examined yearly by the
TEA, only about one eighth to a quarter actually could benefit from state action.188
Nevertheless, the TEA dutifully continued to do this unnecessary job. The result was
wasted resources which could have been better utilized to help the districts that merited
direction.189
In retrospect the judge realized that placing the TEA in the role of enforcer of the
Court’s order was a mistake.
I imposed this burden on the Texas Education Agency without any form of
monitoring because I believed the United States Department of Justice was going to
stay very active and would perform the monitoring functions themselves. I
anticipated that they would have someone down there most of the time checking
TEA activities to see that the order of the court was complied with. However, it was
about that same time that the Nixon administration began, and I noticed immediately
a significant decline in enforcement activity. The administration and its Department
of Justice did not have the same attitude toward school desegregation nor the
earnestness that the prior administration had.190

Seeking to rectify this mistake, Justice invited a number of Hispanic activist groups to
appear as plaintiff-intervenor in the case. 191 He hoped that they would provide the
necessary oversight of the TEA’s enforcement activities to assure compliance with the
law. The judge was ultimately disappointed in the results, however. “The actions that
[these activist groups] have taken through the years have been sporadic; there has been
no day-to-day supervision or monitoring of the activities of TEA at all. Apparently, they
do not have funds to do that, or even see the need to do so.”192 The result was that by
1983, despite years of review by the TEA, significant pockets of segregation still
remained in the Texas schools.
3. Exploring Enforcement Alternatives
The enforcement problems experienced by Judge Justice were not unique to Texas.
Finding an effective means of making integration real in both form and effect was
extremely difficult given the limits of the traditional enforcement tools available to a
judge. The judge could make all the orders he wished, but if the various players in a
187

Id.
Id. Kemerer provides data of this process for 1981. Of 196 districts above the 66
percent line, 95 were effective unitary districts, 45 had majority-minority populations, and 30
were under separate court order. This left only 26 districts for which annual reports could
prove useful.
189
Id.
190
KEMERER, supra note 130, at 129-30 (quoting William Wayne Justice).
191
Id. at 130.
192
Id. at 129-30 (quoting Justice).
188
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dispute chose to ignore these orders, or only provide lip-service, the court’s dictates
were meaningless: mere words irrelevant to the matters at hand. Nor was the threat of
criminal or civil punishment always an adequate means of assuring compliance. Given
the public nature of these matters, their extended time frame, the large number of
people involved, and the general support government officials had in opposing
integration, threats of punishment were often ignored with impunity. Even where the
court backed up its threat of sanctions, this often had the perverse effect of creating
martyrs and hence more opposition to compliance. 193 For integration to work,
continual, hands-on court oversight was necessary to assure compliance. Yet, how
could a court provide such oversight? The traditional conception of a court’s functions
involved providing a neutral forum “for settling disputes between private parties about
private rights.”194 In this context, litigation was by nature simply a dispute between
clearly identified parties over past events, initiated by the litigants, premised on evidence
supplied by those parties and providing relief in direct proportion to the substantive
violation in contention (i.e. the remedy must be in direct proportion to the specific
wrong caused by the defendant).195 Yet civil rights suits are nothing like this. Here,
the issues in contention involve public policy, not private rights; the “party structure is
sprawling and amorphous,” rather than being clearly delineated; the issues in contention
constantly change over the course of the litigation, as opposed to being fixed and
enduring; and the remedial process is “suffused and intermixed with negotiating and
mediat[ion]” rather than providing “one time, authoritative resolution” to wrongs wholly
committed in the past.196
Civil rights suits, in other words, turn the traditional conception of adjudication on its
head, making enforcement problematic at best, impossible at worst. So, what
enforcement options were available to a judge in such cases? One answer to this
dilemma lay in a unique branch of the federal courts’ private law experience: the
equity/bankruptcy receivership.197 Prior to the rise of the civil rights suit, questions of

193

See generally Mark G. Yudof, Implementation Theories and Desegregation Realities,
32 A LA. L. REV. 441 (1981).
194
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, quoted in AMERICAN
LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 413 (Lawrence Friedman &
Harry Scheiber, eds., 1997).
195
Id.
196
Chayes, supra note 194, at 414; David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company:
Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV.
313, 325-28 (1981).
197
Bankruptcy and equity receiverships are not the same action, but are very similar in
content and effect. A bankruptcy court is an equity court and both actions are part of the
federal courts jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. However, bankruptcy requires a congressional statute to be put into force, while
equity is an inherent part of the federal courts jurisdiction. Otherwise, bankruptcy and equity
operate in a similar manner with the receivership function of equity and the trusteeship
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bankruptcy, probate, trusts and creditor’s rights provided some of the most troubling
and complex issues for the federal courts.198 As would be the case with civil rights
actions, bankruptcy cases involved conflicting claims from a wide range of litigants to
enormous amounts of varied resources. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,199 as well
as general equity jurisdiction, any debtor could request bankruptcy proceedings and the
appointment of a trustee on an application of insolvency.200 Also, any creditor owed a
debt four months past due could request an involuntary bankruptcy. In either case, the
courts would appoint a trustee or receiver to watch over, and if necessary, operate the
estate of the bankrupt. In its earliest forms, such trusteeships/receiverships were only a
means of maintaining a property before liquidating it; the receiver simply was a
conservator for the creditors’ interests. In the late Nineteenth century, however, the
federal courts, in response to the economic necessity of some forms of property (such
as railroads) for economic development, restructured the receivership concept,
emphasizing reorganization and long-term productivity over immediate disposal of the
property to pay off creditors.201 This new type of receivership protected the company
from its creditors, raised new capital through the selling of receiver's bonds and
generally trimmed the debt that had caused the company to fail in the first place. The
end goal of such receiverships was to return the company to its creditors renewed and
financially sound while providing at all times its necessary economic services to the
wider community. The result was to make the federal courts into partners with (or
perhaps, better stated, guardians of) the failing company, overseeing, in the person of
function of bankruptcy providing essentially the same services. Though historically, there
was a bias in Bankruptcy matters toward dissolution of the company for the benefits of its
creditors while equity receiverships were used to rebuild the company and return it to its
stockholders. However, bankruptcy receiverships could be used to rebuild and return a
company from the brink of dissolution while equity receiverships could be used to dissolve a
company where necessary. See generally Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson, Comment, Equitable
Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neorecieverships to Implement Large Scale
Institutional Change, 1976 W IS . L. REV. 1161.
198
For a discussion of the complexities and the ways federal courts transformed the
equity receivership in response to such complexities, see Albro Martin, Railroads and the
Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST’Y 685 (1974); see
also Theodore Eisenberg & Stephan C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 482-86 (1980); Johnson, supra note 197, at
1168-69.
199
11 U.S.C. §§ 61-82 (1898), repealed by § 401(a) of Public Law 95-598.
200
See generally Charles Thomas Payne, The General Administration of Equity
Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685 (1922); Warner Fuller, The Background and
Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations-A Survey, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 375 (1940). On Bankruptcy, see Graydon Staring, Bankruptcy: An
Historical View, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1157 (1985); CHARLES W ARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1935).
201
On evolution of receiverships in 19th century, see generally Payne, supra note 200;
FULLER, supra note 200.
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the receiver or trustee, the day to day operation of the company for extended periods of
time. 202
To achieve these ends, the federal courts created a series of enforcement tools
and/or procedures which extended well past the traditional conception of a court’s
proper role in litigation. Since economic reorganizations were often long- term
processes, involving large numbers of litigants and interveners, the courts routinely
retained jurisdiction in these matters following final judgement.203 Often, this retention
of jurisdiction was matched with the implementation of a mandatory injunction
demanding compliance with the Court’s reorganization plan and outlining the penalties
to be faced for non-compliance. 204 This injunction, in turn, was often part of a detailed
and sweeping decree outlining the basic premises of the reorganization plan (and
sometimes the very steps to be taken in reorganizing).205 The court then had the
choice of returning enforcement to those involved (i.e. using its final decree to set
policies which a trustee, chosen by the company’s stockholders or creditors, would
follow in completing the actual reorganization) or of turning to independent experts to
help in working enforcing remedial plans.206 This latter help usually came in the person
of a receiver and/or special master appointed directly by the Judge, but could also come
from expert witnesses and special interveners brought in to help in the formation of
appropriate decrees, orders and/or oversight of the property.207
What all three types of judicial adjuncts provided was information and expertise.
202

For an additional detailed description of the origins of receiverships as well as a
discussion of the linkage between bankruptcy receiverships and Civil Rights suits, see
generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 198; Johnson, supra note 197.
203
For a detailed description of this process, see Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 198, at
482-86; Johnson, supra note 197, at 1168-69.
204
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 198, at 482-86; Johnson, supra note 197, at 1168-69.
205
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 198, at 482-86; Johnson, supra note 197, at 1168-69.
206
In other words, trustees and receivers had essentially the same roles, the one major
difference being that the trustee was picked by litigants themselves to watch over the
reorganization, while receiver was chosen directly by the Judge. Often, this trustee was
associated with the management of the company. Masters, or special masters as they were
sometimes known, served as the court’s fact-finders: conducting hearings on behalf of the
court, determining questions of fact and of law, ruling on admissibility of evidence,
conducting investigations, recommending sanctions and determining the value of property
and damages. Often, Masters had the additional job of supervising trustees and receivers,
reporting to the Judge as appropriate. Staring, supra note 200, at 1162; see generally Payne,
supra note 200, at 685-701; William O. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of
Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestion, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1932).
207
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32
A LA. L. REV. 271, 274 (1981); Note, Receiverships as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 132 (1969); Eisenberg and Yeazell, supra note 198, at 482-86; Johnson,
supra note 197, at 1168-69.
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They were the judge’s eyes, ears and hands. Judges were not businessmen, and they
did not understand all the ins and outs of operating a particular business. The detailed
explanations of the workings of the property provided by these adjuncts enabled the
judge to make informed decisions. And, once that decision was made, they were
available to either carry out or oversee its application.
Once appointed, receivers208 had a wide range of powers and authority over the
company in receivership. Oversight of a receiver was often pro-forma. 209 Since the
primary goal of the Court in organizing a receivership was the continuation of bankrupt
company’s services, not the protection of its creditors, most receivers were given a
free hand in operating the bankrupt company.210 As early as the 1870s the federal
courts had ruled that "all outlays of the receiver . . . made in good faith in the ordinary
course of business . . . and with a view to advance and promote the road . . . are fairly
within the line of discretion necessarily allowed him."211 Only in cases of
“extraordinary” expenses would the court examine the receiver's actions.212 As to
reorganization plans, the court’s oversight was often limited to accepting or denying the
finished plan.213 Sometimes the courts would appoint a special master to hold hearings
examining the receiver’s requests to determine what were “ordinary” and what were
“extraordinary” expenses or actions.214 Yet, in as much as most receivers were
chosen for the position because of their knowledge and expertise, such requests for
additional funds or for authority to reorganize procedures were usually granted, as were
requests for injunctive support.215
This ability to raise new revenue and to reorganize operating procedures was the
most significant and useful of the receiver’s powers. Receivers were effectively given
control of the company (under court supervision) and had full power to hire and fire
employees, to contract with suppliers and customers, to sell or mortgage portions of
the company, and to raise new revenues by the issuing of receiver’s certificates.216 For

208

For the purpose of this article, the term receiver will be used to denote receivers,
masters or trustees unless otherwise noted.
209
See CHARLES ZELDEN, JUSTICE LIES IN THE DISTRICT 41-45 (1983); Staring, supra note
200, at 1162; Douglas & Marshall, supra note 206, at 25; see generally Payne, supra note 200.
210
Staring, supra note 200, at 1162.
211
Cowdrey v. Railroad, Co., 6 F. Cas., 660, 662 (1870).
212
Id.
213
St. Louis Frog and Switch Co. v. St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico R.R., No. 36 (S.D.
Tex. 1912) (providing an example of this process). The files in this case fill over 15 storage
boxes. Most of these files are made up of reports and requests by the receiver to the Court
requesting the right to raise money through receiver's bonds or to improve the physical
condition of the road. The majority of requests were approved by the Court.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
See generally Martin, supra note 198; see also Payne, supra note 200, at 685-701;
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the duration of the receivership, they were the boss, and as such, had full authority to
construct a reorganization plan to their own specifications (although, once again, under
direct court supervision and approval of the plan).217 The norm was for receivers to
work closely with the interested parties, including the stockholders, secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, employees and state government officials.218 But, all these
interests were explicitly subordinate to the needs of the wider community.219 As
Judge Waller T. Burns of the Southern District of Texas noted in a 1915, where the
property in receivership “was in bad shape, creditors ha[d] no reasonable grounds to
expect an early adjustment of their accounts,” until every effort had been “made by the
Receiver, under the direction of the Court, to put the property in such shape as to
220
permit its operation.”
Only after the public's interest had been served and continued
service was assured was the court to concern itself with creditors' rights.221
It was to these enforcement procedures that the district Courts turned to in response
to the Supreme Court’s demand for action in 1968. Brown II222 had noted that civil
rights cases “call for the exercise of . . . traditional attributes of equity power”;223
Green224 made clear the High Court’s commitment to change. With little time or
discretion in these matters, the district judges (who, we should recall, were not overly
enthused with the job) turned to the familiar equity procedures of the past for guidance
and found the receivership model applicable in constructing remedies to enforcement
problems. “The comprehensive remedial decrees” for civil rights matters, notes Judge
Frank M. Johnson, Jr. of the middle District of Alabama and later the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, “presents no more than the use of conventual judicial tools for dealing
with complexity and intransigence in an unconventual setting”225 Legal scholars
Theodore Eisneberg and Stephen Yeazell agree, noting how “what is said to be new in

Fuller, supra note 200, at 377-92.
217
See St. Louis Frog, No. 36, (S.D. Tex., 1912); see also ZELDEN, supra note 209.
218
See generally Martin, supra note 198; see also Payne, supra note 200, at 685-701;
Fuller, supra note 200, at 377-92.
219
Fuller, supra note 219, at 382-92.
220
Letter from Waller T. Burns, Judge of the Southern District of Texas, Letters, to
Southwestern Mercantile Agency, vol. 5, no. 2, at 239 (Apr. 19, 1915) (to be archived in the
University of Texas Law Library). See also Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 66 F.
Supp 845, 858 (1946), rev’d, 158 F.2d 109 (1946), vacated, 332 U.S. 748 (1947) (“the interests of
the public and the duty of the carrier to continue to provide transportation are given
precedence over the interests of secured and unsecured creditors . . . and stockholders . . . .
[T]he public’s right in the matter has always been preferred to the property rights of all other
persons.”).
221
Farmers Grain, 66 F. Supp. at 858.
222
349 U.S. 294.
223
Id. at 300.
224
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
225
Johnson, supra note 197, at 274.
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these cases [civil rights suits] is really only a response to the problems of intransigence
and complexity that the law had dealt with in ‘extraordinary’ ways for centuries.”226
This “extraordinary” way, in turn, was the equity receivership and its enforcement
corollaries.227
Viewed from this perspective, United States v. Texas228 exemplifies one of the
receivership model’s basic mechanisms: the appointment of receivers or other experts
to act as the court’s eyes, ears and hands (first the use of the TEA and later the
Hispanic political reform groups) to assure compliance with the court’s orders.
Though this process did not work as planed, it does show the method that would be
used with greater effect in other cases. (It also shows the inherent dangers in such
appointments. For the receivership process to work, the receiver had to act in good
faith and with positive effect).
An example of a case in which the process worked as planned was the 1965 case of
Turner v. Goolsby. 229 In this Southern District of Georgia case, the Talioferro County
School Board had circumvented a court-ordered desegregation plan to integrate the
district’s two segregated schools by closing the white-only school and busing the white
students to schools in adjoining counties.230 The Court responded with an order to halt
this practice. 231 The school board resisted.232 Realizing that an injunction alone would
not force compliance and thus resolve the dispute, the Court turned to alternate
enforcement methods.233 As the three-judge panel noted, “in order to avoid irreparable
injury to the white children which would result from enjoining the use of public funds
for their education, and to preserve the rights of 87 Negro applicants for transfer, the
[District] Court . . . concluded that in the exercise of its equity power it will be
necessary to place the school system of Taliaferro County in receivership.”234 To this
end, the three judge panel hearing this case appointed the state superintendent of
schools as receiver with instructions to submit a remedial plan that would assure
compliance with the court’s desegregation order.235 The state official quickly
complied. Entering into negotiations with the various school districts involved in this
case, the receiver convinced the surrounding school districts where the white students
of Talioferro County were attending to accept the county’s black students as well. 236
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 198, at 491.
Id.
United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966).
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 733.
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He then made sure that the buses used to transport the children, and the facilities in
these other districts, were desegregated.237 The initial problem solved, the receiver was
then directed to investigate longer-term problems. These included academic outcomes
(black students from Talioferro county were failing in the adjoining county schools) and
the desegregation of the Talioferro county schools (the adjoining county schools had
made clear their refusal to accept any Talioferro students in subsequent years).238 The
receiver responded to the outcomes problem by first investigating the usefulness of
remedial instruction, and then, by exploring the means available to fund such
instruction. In as much as the state had no funds for remedial instruction (and as the
state superintendent of schools he knew this), his response was to produce and submit
a court plan to the Department of Health, Welfare and Education for federal funding.239
On the greater problem of desegregation, the receiver worked with the board of
education to produce a desegregation plan that was acceptable to all parties.240 At this
time, he reported his successes back to the court and was dismissed from his
position.241
State officials were not the only source of receivers. Another option was to use the
Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964,242 the HEW was given the job of policing the desegregation process of southern
schools.243 Title VI of the Act authorized the HEW to deny federal funds to any school
maintaining a dual education system.244 At the urging of President Johnson, HEW
officials promptly sought to fulfill this function, issuing in December 1964 an order to
all southern school districts to submit desegregation plans or forfeit their federal
funding.245 Four months later, the HEW issued guidelines for districts to follow in
drafting these plans; in 1966 and 1968, ever more stringent guidelines were
announced.246 The result was to make the HEW a force in almost every southern
school desegregation case. 247 It also meant that guidelines were available to the courts
237
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Chadsey, supra note 245, at 113 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80; 45 C.F.R. § 181 (1966)). The 1968
Guidelines, titled “Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance With Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” are found in 33 Fed. Reg. 4955 (1968).
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See generally James R. Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in
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in defining acceptable integration plans.248
It was an availability that many courts chose to make use of. In Wittenberg v.
Greenville County School District, 249 a 1969 case involving some twenty-two South
Carolina school districts, a special four-judge panel faced “the task of fashioning
decrees that will assure compliance by the school districts with the applicable
constitutional standards.”250 The problem, the Court noted, was that the districts varied
so widely as to size, make-up and racial composition, that they did not “lend themselves
to a uniform type of decree.”251 The Court’s answer was to turn to the HEW for help
in finding site appropriate remedies.
The difficulties involved in developing a proper decree concern . . . practical
operational question and matters of educational administration. H. E. W., with
its staff of trained educational experts ‘with their day-to-day experiences with
thousands of school systems,’ is far better qualified to deal with such . . .
problems than the Courts presided over by Judges, who, as one Court has
phrased it, ‘do not have sufficient competence -- they are not educators or
school administrators -- to know the right questions, much less the right
answers’252
At the least, the Court went on to note, “it would seem H. E. W. should be solicited
by the Courts to provide expert advice and guidance in determining applicable standards
and in passing on the adequacy of the desegregation plans submitted by the defendant
school districts.”253 From such cooperation, “a greater approximation of uniformity
and equality of treatment in plans of desegregation among similar school districts in a
State would be possible.”254 To this end, the judges ordered the defendant school
districts to “promptly submit” to the HEW a report listing their “existing methods of
operation,” as well as their thoughts on ways to desegregating their schools.255 They
were then to “seek, within 30 days, to develop, in conjunction with the experts of
[HEW], an acceptable plan of operation, conformable to the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs . . . and consonant in timing and method with the practical and administrative
problems faced by the particular district.”256 If this plan could be developed to the

promoting school desegregation has been over-emphasized at the expense of the effect that
district court rulings had in shaping the desegregation process. Chadsey, supra note 245, at
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satisfaction of the HEW within thirty days, “such plan shall be adopted as the decree of
this Court.”257 If no plan acceptable to the HEW was adopted, the HEW was
“requested to submit promptly its [own] recommendation of an acceptable plan for the
school district in question.”258 And, “absent some special showing by the parties” as to
the plan’s “constitutional infirmity,” the Court would then “proceed without further
hearing to enter its decree” based on this plan as amended by the suggestions of the
defendants and plaintiffs.259
In United States v. Watson Chapel School District No. 24, 260 a 1970 case arising out
of the Eastern District of Arkansas, Judge Oren Harris turned to an HEW integration
plan in response to the School District’s repeated refusal to come up with a workable
alternative of its own.261 In fact, rather than come up with a plan that met the
Constitutional requirement to produce a unitary system, the Board had simply objected,
and objected, and objected once again, to both the integration order and the HEW
plan.262 Their reasoning: a stated belief that “there is no constitutional requirement for
race mixing.”263 Hence, though he waited “patiently and painstakingly” for the school
board to change its attitude, ultimately, the judge was forced to act: “The school district
has failed and refused to present a plan reasonably expected to comply with the law.”264
This left “the Court [with] no alternative at this late date but to require the school
district to operate under a lawful system.”265 To this end, the Court, after considering
“the two plans recommended by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as
well as other alternatives,” concluded that the HEW plans “offer[ed] a more reasonable
and adequate solution to the school’s needs and the requirements for a unitary system
as required by law.”266 On appeal, the Eight Circuit endorsed the use of the HEW
plans.267
Other cases where the courts chose to make use of the HEW’s services included:
the 1969 case of Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 268 where a Middle
District of Alabama judge approved a desegregation plan for neighborhood zoning of
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schools matched with the pairing of city and rural schools proposed by the Board, but
constructed in cooperation with the HEW.”269 Later that year, the same court, in the
case of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 270 ordered the Justice Department,
as intervener-plaintiff, to have the HEW study the problem and make recommendations
to help the school board arrive at a workable plan.271 Should the subsequent plan be
deemed unable to “realistically and effectively disestablish the dual system based on
race,” Judge Frank Johnson concluded, the HEW was to submit its own plan.272
Meanwhile, in 1971, Judge Bulter of the Eastern District of North Carolina named the
HEW as “its consultant” with the job of developing a desegregation plan “in cooperation
with the school board’s administrative staff.”273 When the Board objected to the plan
submitted by the HEW, the court directed the Board to implement the HEW plan.274
The availability of the HEW to serve the receiver function proved fortuitous for the
district courts. In using HEW guidelines, judges were finally able to share “the
nettlesome school problem, to be freer of the weary load, so complex and controversial,
that Brown II had assigned them.”275 More importantly, their use pointed to the
primary reason for turning to the receivership model in the first place: the ongoing and
complex nature of such cases. It was with this in mind that the Fifth Circuit in
Jefferson276 had recommended that, as judges were “not educators or school
administrators,” and thus lacked “sufficient competence . . . to know the right
question, much less the right answers” in these matters, “courts in this circuit should
give great weight to future HEW Guidelines.”277 The result was that HEW guidelines
served as the foundation of desegregation plans across the south.278
Of course, not all judges chose to make use of State Officials or the HEW. Other
options were available. In Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 279 Judge Frank
Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama, in addition to seeking the help of the HEW,
turned regularly to the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division to fill aspects of the
receiver role. A large and complex case, Lee involved the desegregation of almost all of
the state’s school systems.280 Adopted in response to the continual opposition to his
desegregation orders by Alabama Governor George Wallace, and the subsequent lack of
269
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integration in the state, the judgment required a “uniform state-wide plan for school
desegregation” for every school district not already under the a court order.281 Given
the overwhelming nature of this task (Judge Johnson would subsequently spend much
of his time for the next year and a half in implementing this order)282 the Judge turned
to the Civil Rights Division’s head, John Doar, for help in constructing, implementing
and enforcing the integration plans. “I think John Doar, speaking for the civil rights
division on the Department of Justice, had a special role in Frank Johnson’s
courtroom,” writes Owen Fiss, aid to Doar at that time. 283 “Judge Johnson . . . invited
the Department of Justice in because he wanted a lawyer in that case he could have
total confidence in -- someone that would be a friend of the court, who could advise the
court.”284 Johnson did this, Fiss holds, in large part out of a high respect for Doar.
“There was something like total respect for each other, total confidence.”285 Yet, the
Judge also did this because, if such a large integration plan were to work, he needed
“information on what [was] going to effectively desegregate the schools. . . a kind of
technocratic advice on what was needed to get the job done” as well as a “kind of
factual justification for what [he] was doing.”286 This was exactly the service provided
by the federal lawyers. “When we finished trying one of these cases, Judge Johnson
had the sort of factual predicate -- or basis -- to exercise coercive power.”287 As a
result, “most of the witnesses, most of the information, most of the discovery was
always done by the Department of Justice.”288
In Jacksonville, Florida, Judge Bryan Simpson turned to a university research center
for help. This case, that of Mims v. Duval County School Board, 289 posed the usual
enforcement problems for a desegregation suit. In 1960 Judge Simpson had ordered
the school board to produce a desegregation plan; the board had returned in 1963 with
a combined stair-step/freedom-of-choice program which the judge quickly approved.290
Progress, however, proved very slow. In March of 1965, out of a total of about
30,000 black students in the Jacksonville-Duval County school district, only some sixty
black children were attending integrated schools.291 A modification of the
desegregation plan, adopted at that time to speed up the process, proved ineffective. 292
281
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By 1967, Simpson had had enough. Convinced that the board was purposely holding
up the integration process by a mix of racial gerrymandering and transfer politics
(refusing black transfers to white schools while allowing white transfers from
integrated schools to white-only schools), and further that the board was either
unwilling or incapable of producing an effective integration plan, the Judge requested
the help of the South Florida Desegregation Center of the University of Miami. 293 In
January 1969, the Center submitted its report which became the foundation of a new
integration plan.294 At this time, Judge Simpson moved up to the Fifth Circuit. He was
replaced in 1970 by William McRae, Jr., who, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
Green295 and Carter296 decisions, as well as that in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 297 ordered the school superintendent to seek further assistance
from the School Desegregation Center.298 The matter finally came to a head in May of
1971, when a third judge, Gerald B. Tjoflat, brought all the pieces together and imposed
his own plan, one based, in part, on the proposals of the Desegregation Center.299
Another option available to judges in using the receivership model as a guide to
action was to name the school board as trustee for itself. In cases of this sort, the
Court would chose the implantation methods, set this policy with its judgement, and
then leave it to the board to implement this policy under court supervision.300 The most
effective way to do this, and the judges preference in these matters, was for the board
to come up with a workable plan on its own which the Court would then approve. 301
For, as judge after judge would note in their opinions, the burden in coming up with a
desegregation plan lay first and foremost with the school board itself: “before
considering any other desegregation plan, it is incumbent upon the court to examine
proposal of the school board, and if that plan meets constitutional requirements, the
court should look no further.”302 Where the school board fulfilled this burden, the
293

Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 129.
295
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
296
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
297
402 U.S. 1 (1970).
298
Mims, 329 F. Supp. at 129-30.
299
Mims v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 338 F. Supp. 1208, 1209-10 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The
South Florida Desegregation Center was also used (in conjunction with the HEW) in Pate v.
Dade County Sch. Bd., 315 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d and modified, 434 F.2d 1151 (5th
Cir. 1970). Another similar option was the use of private corporations specializing in
desegregation matters. See Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Md. 1972).
300
E.g. Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis Sch. Dist., 329 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ark.
1971); Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish Sch. Bd., 315 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. La. 1970), vacated,
446 F.2d 266 (1971).
301
Gordon, 315 F. Supp. at 901 n.1 (noting “federal courts have long recognized that they
should not endeavor to devise plans for desegregation for any school district when, as here,
the School Board presents a feasible plan that works.”).
302
Yarbrough, 329 F. Supp. at 1064.
294

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/2

36

Zelden: From Rights to Resources

1999]
FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES
courts were very happy to provide formal approval and support. Of course, not many
school boards chose to abide by their constitutional burden in these matters and so the
courts were forced to take more precipitous action.
It was here that many judges turned to alternative sources for integration plans.
This process could be done in any number of different ways. The court could turn to
various types of receivers as described above and below.303 It could also turn to the
plaintiffs or various interveners for proposals, choosing among the many options for the
best possible mix of methods.304 A third option involved mandatory injunctions, often
mixed with suggestions, ordering the board to come up with a workable plan.305 And,
of course, the judge could simply come up with a plan on his own.306
Whatever the source, at some point, the court would choose a plan and issue a
decree requiring the school board to implement said plan. Once again, where the school
board chooses to abide by its constitutional duty, the court could allow the issue to rest,
trusting to the plaintiffs to bring any occasional violations to the court’s attention.
Where the board had already proven intransigent, however, judges usually felt it
necessary to initiate more stringent oversight. While this could mean nothing more than
requiring annual or bi-annual reports from the school board,307 a more common method
of enforcement (and one drawing noticeably from the courts’ experience in business
receiverships) was the creation of bi-racial committees charged with the supervision of
the plan to fill the special master function of the receivership model.
In Miami Florida, for example, after choosing a desegregation plan from a long list
of proposed plans, Judge Atkins ordered the creation of a “Bi-Racial Committee
composed of 12 members, six White and six Black, . . . [to] review the operation of the
majority to minority pupil transfer rule, the transportation system, selection of school
sites, and such other special assignments as the Court may direct.”308 To this end, the
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Committee was “authorized to hold hearings and make recommendations to the Board in
connection with these activities.”309 In Atlanta, a three-judge panel matched the
creation of a bi-racial committee with an order to the litigants to “first present to [the
committee] any disagreement regarding the operation of this order prior to filing a
motion with the Court.310 Meanwhile, in Dallas, Judge William Taylor, Jr. created a
Tri-Ethnic Committee to deal with the problems posed by the City’s large Hispanic and
black populations.311 Charged with the oversight of transportation systems, teacher
assignments, student transfers and the selection of school sites, the Committee was to
report monthly and be given “adequate office space . . . in the federal building” while
the school board “provide[d] sufficient funds for the employment of two secretaries . .
. and appropriate office equipment and supplies.”312 A similar tri-ethnic committee was
created in Corpus Christi as well. 313
A final option available to district judges, and the one closest to the origins of the
receivership model, was to appoint independent experts as receivers. In the initial steps
of the landmark case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 314 for
example, rather than turn to a state or federal official, Judge James B. McMillan turned
to an outside expert, Dr. John A. Finger of Rhode Island College, as receiver.315 He
did this in response to the repeated refusal of the School Board to produce a plan that
met the immediate integration standards set by the Supreme Court in Green. 316 “I asked
the School Board to make those changes on their own,” the judge later noted in a 1981
Senate hearing on school busing, “they declined.”317 In fact, Judge McMillan made
repeated requests to the School Board to work with him in producing a viable plan.
And each time the board declined the invitation.318 Dr. Finger, who had originally
come before the Court as a witness for the plaintiffs,319 responded to his commission
309

Id.
Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
311
Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 953.
312
Id.
313
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 330 F. Supp 1377 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff’d,
modified and remanded, 467 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1971). On the tri-ethnic committee, see Mary
Alice Davis, Cox Modifies Computer Plan, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER, July 30, 1970, at A1.
314
311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. N.C. 1970), vacated, 431 F. 2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
315
Swann, 311 F. Supp. at 266-67, 269. In his judgement, Judge McMillan called Dr. Finger
an “expert.” Id. at 269. But Finger’s powers and actions were that of a receiver.
316
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
317
Court-Ordered School Busing: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Sess.,
529, quoted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN’S W AY (1986).
318
Id.
319
Judge McMillan’s use of a plaintiff’s witness as receiver proved controversial. On
appeal the Fifth Circuit would caution “that when a court needs and expert, it should avoid
appointing a person who has appeared as a witness for one of the parties.” Swann, 431 F. 2d
310

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/2

38

Zelden: From Rights to Resources

1999]
FROM RIGHTS TO RESOURCES
with a comprehensive integration plan shaped to deal with the district’s enforcement
problems.320 In particular, he turned to the then unused option of mandatory busing.321
The same pattern followed one year later, when a Northern District of Mississippi
judge turned to an independent expert in a suit to desegregate the Indianola Municipal
School District.322 The appointment of an independent receiver had not been the
judge’s first choice. In January 1970, the judge, under pressure from the Fifth
Circuit,323 had ordered the school board to adopt and implement an HEW integration
plan. 324 The school board countered with a motion that under this plan “this defendant
school district will remain an all Negro district and the effectiveness of the school
district will be destroyed. . . .”325 They requested, therefore, the appointment of a
special master to study the matter and submit a new plan for the upcoming school
year.326 The judge responded by appointing Dr. James McCullough, of the Mississippi
State University faculty, as Special Master with the task of making “a full study” and all
“proper recommendations” for the desegregation of all grades by the 1970-1971 school
year.327
Still another case where outside receivers were appointed involved the 1971
integration of the Augusta Georgia schools.328 Faced with obstructionism from the
school board, and not receiving the help he expected from the HEW or the Justice
Department (under President Nixon, both the HEW and the Justice Department backed
away from aggressively promoting integration),329 Judge Alexander Lawrence of the
Southern District of Georgia turned to two independent experts to serve as receivers.330
Their job was to produce an integration plan that met all Supreme Court directives and
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the particular needs of the Augusta schools.331 Appointed in August, 1971, the two
receivers quickly came up with a plan which they presented to the court in October of
1971.332 After an extension to allow the interested parties one last chance to come up
with their own plan, and the failure of those parties to act on this chance, the Court
approved the receivers’ plan in January, 1972.333
Rare at first, the use of receivers or other court appointed adjuncts to investigate,
create and/or enforce integration orders had become common in the South by 1971 -especially when one adds in the number of cases where the judge issued a detailed
decree and then forced the defendant school board to act as its own trustee in enforcing
the court order. This number would only increase as integration continued apace in the
South and moved into the large urban school districts of the North.334 The result was
to make the receivership model a foundation for the federal courts’ integration efforts.
4. The Troubling Problem Of Color: The Shift To Color-Conscious Remedies
Whatever its particular form, the wide application of the receivership model for
enforcement in integration cases proved to be a momentous decision. The pairing of
mandatory injunctions and sweeping decrees with the appointment of receivers,
trustees, special masters and/or bi-racial committees, gave the district courts the tools
necessary to overcome the opposition, obstructionism and complexity which to date
had undercut the effectiveness of desegregation decisions. By bringing the expertise
and coercive powers of a court, and its agent the receiver, to bare on these matters, the
federal courts finally had the ability to make integration a real (if not always fully
realized) proposition. By 1972 the South, at forty-six percent, was the most integrated
region in the nation.335 It would continue to be so throughout the decade. 336
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There was, however, one unintended consequence to applying the receivership
model to civil rights matters, one that related directly to the methods chosen to
desegregate dual school districts. School cases posed two pressing problems that had
to be solved if integration were to be a reality: (1) the problem of how much race
mixing was necessary to produce a unitary school district; (2) who to move, and in
what manner, to achieve this proper mix. As noted above, integration cases were
normally big, complex and difficult for the district courts to handle. Even where the
judge was ready to take the heat of a decision for immediate integration, implementing a
plan that met Supreme Court directives, plaintiff’s demands, defendant’s fears and the
never to be forgotten need to provide a quality education for all the students was simply
a difficult proposition.
The receivership model offered an answer to these problems. One of the ways that
traditional receiverships had dealt with the complex issues posed by a bankruptcy
reorganization was by simplifying its relations with those who had a claim on the
company’s assets (creditors, stockholders, employees).337 The problem was that each
of these players had their own specific, and competing, claims; if the receiver were to
deal with each claimant’s needs on an individual basis nothing would ever get done. 338
To rectify this matter, receivers grouped claimants by the nature of their claims on the
company.339 That is to say, stockholders were treated as a single group; so too
employees, etc. With creditors, who usually made up the most numerous of claimants,
the receiver would take the classification scheme ever further, categorizing the creditors
by the nature of the debts owed to them. In this way, those holding a mortgage to the
company would be separated out from more common bond holders, who would in turn
be categorized separately from unsecured creditors (suppliers and service providers).340
The effect of such categorization was to impose a group, as opposed to individual,
perspective in these matters. This shift proved significant, since which category you
were placed in affected your respective rights to the company’s assets. In 1913, the
Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd341 had held that the respective
claims to a company’s assets must be ranked as to their proper order of priority.342
Participation in the reorganized company, in turn, would be distributed to claimants in
descending order based on those priorities.343 When the assets were fully distributed,
337

See Payne, supra note 200, at 689-93.
Id.
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
228 U.S. 482 (1913).
342
Id. at 504-05.
343
Id. at 508. This doctrine was reinforced by the Supreme Court in the 1939 case of Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-22 (1939); see also Walter J. Blum &
Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI.
L. REV. 651, 654-55 (1974).
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the process ended, even if some lower ranked claimants received nothing.344 This
meant that it did not matter if you had one share or one thousand in terms of how the
receiver viewed your rights in these matters, you were treated the same. More
significantly, it meant that a bond holder owed $100 had a greater claim on the receiver
for action than an unsecured creditor owed $10,000. The individual’s particular needs
were subordinated to the group’s, and the remedies provided were aimed at meeting the
group’s general needs and rights -- even where, on an individual basis, this produced an
injustice.
Applied to civil rights, this group perspective lent itself to the shift from color-blind
(i.e. individual) remedies to race-based (i.e. group) remedies. Circuit Judge John Minor
Wisdom had pointed the way toward race-conscience enforcement of the equal
protection clause in Jefferson I:345
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict
with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes
harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the
Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent
discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
The criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate government purpose. 346
In order to make integration work, in other words, the courts would have to
recognize and apply race in constructing remedies. Yet to do so on an individual basis
was an enormous task: deciding that for student A, race was an issue, while for
student B, it was not, was difficult; doing so for each of tens of thousands of students,
was impossible. Yet race-based remedies were clearly called for if the Supreme
Court’s directives were to be met. It was in attempting to deal with this dilemma that
district Judges turned to the method of group-based remedies inherent in the
receivership model -- in particular, the application of specific ratios and quotas matched
with mandatory busing (or other extreme measures) in faculty hiring, facilities
construction and student transfers as the means of shifting these bodies around.
Take, for example, the issue of faculty integration. Prior to Brown, 347 teachers were
as segregated by race as their students.348 It therefore followed that when the courts
344

Blum & Kaplan, supra note 343, at 654-55.
372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
346
Id. at 876.
347
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
348
E.g., Macklin v. County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 4392 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 1966), noted
in 11 RACE REL. L. REP . 805, 805-06 (1966); Thompson v. County Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 4274 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 22, 1966), noted in 11 RACE REL. L. REP . 1311, 1311-14 (1966); Turner v. County Sch.
Bd., Civ. No. 4343 (E.D. Va. May 4, 1966), noted in 11 Race REL. L. REP . 1314, 1314-15 (1966);
Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., Civ. No. 16173-F (E.D. La. July 27, 1967), noted in 12 RACE
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ordered student integration, they would order the same for teachers and staff. This, in
fact, was what many district courts did. Yet problems quickly arose. Few school
districts wanted any form of integration. For many whites, the thought of black
teachers teaching white students was horrific.349 Opposition to teacher integration
therefore proved as strong as that for students. Yet, in many ways, the issue of faculty
integration was the easier problem to solve; the numbers were smaller, and the
problems associated with moving students between schools did not exist here. Still,
despite this greater facility for integration, few school districts sought to integrate
teachers. Many sought to delay as long as possible. 350 This obstructionism forced
district judges to respond in new ways. And for many judges, this new way was to set
explicit faculty integration goals based on the districts ratio of white to black teachers.
The landmark case in this matter was Carr v. Montgomery County Board of
Education. 351 Argued before Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., the case began in 1964
with an order to the school board to adopt a desegregation plan for both students and
faculty.352 In regards to faculty integration, the order read that:
Race or color will henceforth not be a factor in hiring, assignment, reassignment,
promotion, demotion, or dismissal of teachers and other professional staff, with the
exception that assignments shall be made in order to eliminate the effects of past
discrimination. Teachers, principals, and staff members will be assigned to schools
so that the faculty and staff is not composed of members of one race.353

It went on to order the “Superintendent of Schools and his staff” to “take affirmative
steps to solicit and encourage teachers presently employed to accept transfers to
schools in which the majority of the faculty members are of a race different from that
of the teacher transferred” beginning in September 1967.354 Progress proved very
slow, however. As of February 1968, only thirty-two teachers were “teaching pupils in
schools that were predominantly of the opposite race.” This, out of a pool of some 550
REL. L. REP . 1279, 1279-80 (1967); August v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction (N.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 1967),
noted in 12 RACE REL. L. REP . 796, 796-97 (1967).
349
See Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d,
400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (providing an example of parent opposition
to integrated faculties).
350
E.g., id.; Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 314 F. Supp 1282 (W.D. La. 1970), rev’d in
part and aff’d in part, 434 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1970); Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ.,
273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. N.C. 1967), aff’d, 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968); Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F.
Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see also Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F. 2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 494 F. 2d. 575 (5th Cir. 1974).
351
289 F. Supp 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff’d, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), reh’g denied, 402 F.2d
th
782 (5 Cir. 1968), rev’d, 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
352
Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 253 F. Supp. 306, 307 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
353
Id. at 310.
354
Id.
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black and 815 white teachers. 355 Most of this movement, in turn, took place in the
limited environment of the high schools and within the City of Montgomery.356 As for
new hires, since the 1967 order the district had hired thirty-two new teachers, twentysix white and six black.357 Of this number, twenty of the white teachers were
appointed to white majority schools while all of the black teachers were assigned to
those where blacks were the majority.358 The same pattern followed for substitute and
student teachers.359
Angered that fourteen years after Brown360 created an affirmative duty for school
boards to disestablish their dual school systems teachers were still segregated as to
race, Judge Johnson felt that the time for action had come. Further delay was not an
option. To this end, the Judge issued a detailed desegregation order whose foundation
was based on the simple proposition that “the school board will be guided by the ratio
of Negro to white faculty members in the school system as a whole.”361 This was to
be achieved by “hiring and assigning faculty members so that in each school the ratio of
white to Negro faculty members [was] substantially the same as . . . throughout the
system.”362 At that time, the ratio of white to black was 3 to 2. Therefore, a 3 to 2
ratio was to be the “ultimate objective” or proof of success in integrating faculty and
staff.363 And, to help the school board achieve this ratio, the Judge laid out a specific
schedule to follow. In the first year, “at every school with fewer than twelve
teachers,” the board was to have “at least two full-time teachers whose race [was]
different from the race of the majority of faculty”; for those schools with more than 12
teachers, “at least one of every six faculty and staff members” was to differ from the
majority.364 The second year would see the full implementation of the 3 to 2 ratio.365
As to the troubling issue of how to move teachers to achieve these standards, the Judge
left it up to the school board to find its preferred method. However, the Judge noted
that, should the school board not “achieve faculty desegregation by inducing voluntary
transfers or by filling vacancies,” then it was to do so “by the assignment and transfer
of teachers from one school to another,” involuntarily if necessary.366
This case was subsequently appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which, in a split decision,
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366

Carr, 289 F. Supp. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Carr, 289 F. Supp. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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modified Johnson’s decree. 367 In particular, the majority on the panel questioned the
application of explicit racial targets as a guide to integration. Not that they objected to
mandatory teacher transfers or even the idea of target dates, rather they were
uncomfortable with the idea of fixed standards and the use of mathematical ratios based
on race to determine full compliance. 368 Consequently, they held that “because of the
difficulties inherent in achieving a precise five-to-one ratio, this part of the district
court’s order should be interpreted to mean substantially or approximately five to
one.”369
This was a position that the Circuit’s Chief Judge, John R. Brown, and others on the
circuit court felt dangerous.370 While the specificity of Johnson’s opinion was
something new, and perhaps scary, it was a necessary step if faculty integration was to
succeed. “Specifics are needed,” the Chief Judge wrote. 371 “Specifics are needed by
the school administrators. Specifics are needed by the Negroes who have waited these
14 years for ‘a bona fide unitary system where schools are not white schools or Negro
schools -- just schools.’”372 And, though not explicitly stated, it was clear specific
deadlines, standards and mathematical ratios were necessary if the district judges were
to do the job given them.373 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices agreed with
this view.374 “The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of
course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity
to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified,
unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope. We
believe it best to leave Judge Johnson’s order as written rather than as modified by the
2-1 panel.”375
Things were a little more complicated when the issue moved from teachers to
students. It was not that the constitutional issues were significantly different, but that
the practical problems in moving students was simply so much greater than that for
faculty. Consider the practical problems posed in the case of Swann v. Charlotte-

367

Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 400 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 5-7.
369
Id.
370
The first opinion from the Fifth Circuit involved a panel of only three judges, one of
whom objected to the views of the others. Carr, 400 F.2d at 1. Judge Brown’s comments are
made in regards to a motion for the entire Fifth Circuit to hear the case en banc, a motion
subsequently denied by a majority of the Court’s members. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ. v. Carr, 402 F. 2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968).
371
Carr, 402 F. 2d. at 785.
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Id.
373
Id.
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United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-37 (1969).
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Id. at 235.
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Mecklenburg Board of Education. 376 The difficulty was two-fold. First, there was the
intransigence of the school board. In 1965 when this case was first filed, of the 20,000
black students in the district, only 490 attended schools with whites, and most of those
(80%) were in one school with seven white pupils.377 When asked to fix this problem,
the school board, in common with many boards in the south at this time, chose to
implement a freedom-of-choice plan in which students could transfer into any school
they wished so long as they provided their own transportation.378 By the time things
came to a head in a 1970 hearing, only some 14,000 of the now 24,000 black students
attended integrated schools (this out of a total population of 84,000 students).379 The
Board refused to go any further; its members felt they had done enough to meet the
court’s demands, and enough was enough.380 As one of the Board’s attorneys put it,
“We truly felt that this school system had done what complied with the constitutional
mandates.”381 The result was obstructionism and delay.
Even more troubling were the problems posed by the districts size. In 1960, as a
cost saving measure, city and county officials merged the Charlotte city and
Mecklenburg county schools into a single district. Spanning twenty-two miles eastwest, and thirty-six miles north-south, the district encompassed some 550 square
miles.382 Mere size was not the only problem, however. Adding difficulties was the
fact that students were not evenly distributed across the district.383 Most blacks lived
in the city, while whites were spread out across the city and county.384 Any integration
plan was going to have to figure out a way of moving these bodies, or creating a truly
unitary system would be an impossibility. Moving students between schools, in fact,
had been one of the key problems with the freedom-of-choice plan in place at this
time. 385
As noted above, faced with the boards constant refusal to act on their own, Judge
James McMillan appointed a receiver, Dr. John A. Finger, to come up with an effective
integration plan.386 Dr. Finger’s response to the problems in this case was a mix of the

376

311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. N.C. 1970), vacated, 431 F. 2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff’d in part,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
377
Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 317, at 14-18.
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Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
379
Id. at 7.
380
Id. at 7-11; SCHWARTZ, supra note 317, at 14-18 (describing the School Board’s views).
381
SCHWARTZ, supra note 317, at 14.
382
For details of the school district see Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7.
383
Id. at 6.
384
Id.
385
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (W.D.
N.C. 1969).
386
A consultant will be designated by the court to prepare immediately plans and
recommendations to the court for desegregation of the schools. The legal and practical
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familiar and inventive. In response to the Board’s intransigence and the concurrent
problem of how to mix the student population to achieve racial parity, Finger chose to
utilize cluster attendance zones, school pairing and the application of race based
ratios.387 Cluster zones and school pairing were two related methods for promoting
integration. Under such plans, districts would be divided into attendance zones based
on the racial make-up of the region. Particular zones (and schools within zones) would
then be paired together and the students of different races shifted between the schools
to effectively mix the races. Mixing could occur by grade (e.g. all the zone’s students
in grades 1-4 would attend one school, while all those in 5-6 would attend the other) or
by school (e.g. half the zone’s students would attend school A, while half would attend
school B).388 In Charlotte, the Finger plan as finally adopted, called at the high school
level for the use of attendance zones which were -- as described by the Supreme Court
in is ruling in this matter -- “typically shaped like wedges of a pie, extending outward
from the center of the city to the suburban and rural areas of the county in order to
afford residents of the center city area access to outlying schools.”389 As each zone
had only one school, the linking of city and rural parts of the county produced between
seventeen and thirty-six percent integration.390 At the junior high level, the use of
gerrymandered geographic zones was combined with the creation of nine ‘satellite’
(non-contiguous) zones with “inner-city Negro students . . . assigned by attendance
zones to nine outlying predominantly white junior high schools, thereby substantially
desegregating every junior high school in the system.”391 For the district’s seventy-six
elementary schools, Finger minimized the use geographic zoning, and utilized instead a
mix of satellite zoning, school pairing and school grouping to achieve between a nine to
thirty-eight percent black presence in the schools.392
As for the problems of district size and the attendant difficulty in mixing students
living great distances away from each other, Dr. Finger chose the then revolutionary
method of mandatory district-wide busing.393 Such busing was, in fact, the key to the
Finger plan. Cluster/satellite zoning and school pairing could only work if the students
could be freely moved between the respective schools. Given the size of the district,
and the geographic split between city and county, a district-wide busing plan was a
necessity if integration was to be achieved.394 To this end, the Court ordered that

considerations outlined in detail in earlier parts of this opinion and order are for his
guidance.” Swann, 306 F. Supp. at 1313; see also Swann, 311 F. Supp at 265 (noting
appointment of Dr. Finger to this position).
387
Swann, 311 F. Supp at 265 (describing the Finger plan).
388
Id.; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 8-9.
389
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Id. at 9.
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Swann, 311 F. Supp. at 268.
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“transportation be offered on a uniform non-racial basis to all children whose
reassignment to any school is necessary to bring about the reduction of segregation,
and who live farther from the school to which they are assigned than the Board
determines to be walking distance.”395 The judge acknowledged that under his plan, the
district would have to bus as many as 10,000 students per day at a cost of just under
forty dollars per student. However, he pointed out that cost was “not a valid legal
reason for continued denial of a constitutional right.”396
The final step in the Finger plan was the setting of deadlines and target percentages
of racial mixing as a means of judging success.397 In December 1969, Judge
McMillan, in an interim order outlining the standards to be used in constructing an
integration plan, had directed the school board to make every effort “to reach a 71-29
ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school
is racially different from the others .”398 He further went on to note “that no school
[should] be operated with an all-black or predominantly black student body, [and] that
pupils of all grades [should] be assigned in such a way that as nearly as practicable the
various schools at various grade levels [had] about the same proportion of black and
white students.”399 And, while the Judge acknowledged that variations “from the
norm” might be “unavoidable,” he stressed that the results of any integration plan
should come as close to these ratios as possible. 400 Two months later in his final
decree imposing the Finger plan, the judge ordered that the plan be fully implemented by
May 4th, 1970.401 After that date, the school board was to “adopt and implement a
continuing program, computerized or otherwise, of assigning pupil and teachers during
the school year as wall as at the start of each year for the conscious purpose of
maintaining each school . . . in a condition of desegregation.”402
Subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, Swann joined
Brown403 and Green404 in redefining policy on desegregation. The school board
challenged the Finger plan’s use of racial quotas, extreme gerrymandering of attendance
zones and busing, as well as the requirement that every school to be desegregated to
create a unitary district.405 On every count, the Supreme Court upheld Judge
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Swann, 311 F. Supp at 268.
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Id. at 267-69.
Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 268.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 23-24.
Swann, 311 F. Supp at 269-70.
Id. at 269.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Swann, 402 U.S. at 9-10.
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McMillan.406 On the issue of racial quotas, for example, the Court noted that an
“awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system [was] likely to be a
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations.”407 It
therefore concluded that the use of “mathematical ratios” as a “starting point” -- though
not necessarily as an “inflexible requirement” -- was within the “equitable remedial
discretion of the District Court.”408 As to the “sometimes drastic” gerrymandering of
attendance zones into forms that were “neither compact nor contiguous,” the Court also
held that, as an “interim corrective measure” gerrymandering was within the District
Court’s remedial powers.409
All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to
assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a
system that had ben deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial
segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward,
inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on
some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim
period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school
systems.410

The Justices thus held that “in a system with a history of segregation the need for
remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with
its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially
disproportionate in their racial composition.”411 Where a school board’s integration plan
allowed for the continuation of single-race schools, “the burden of showing that such
school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory” rested with the school board.412
The same logic held for the implementation of mandatory busing. In as much as
“busing had been an integral part of public education for years” (in the 1969-70 school
year some 39% of all students nationwide were bused) it was up to the school board to
show that the District Court’s use of busing to integrate the schools posed an
unacceptable risk to the health or education of the child.413 Failing this, District Judges
were well within their rights to order mandatory busing.414
The impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Swann was electric. It gave
406

Swann, 402 U.S. at 1. It should be noted, that the Fourth Circuit upheld Judge
McMillan on everything but the assignment of pupils attending elementary schools. Swann,
431 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1970).
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constitutional force to the adoption by District Courts of race-based standards for
integration, school pairing and mandatory busing on a wide scale. In the months and
years that followed Swann, District Courts across the South implemented integration
plans that included mathematical ratios, system-wide school pairing and mandatory
busing in one form or another. In Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, Judge Woodrow
Seals invited the HEW to file a plan which would comply with the recently announced
Swann requirements.415 That plan, largely adopted by the Judge, employed a mix of
school pairing, restructured attendance zones and busing to solve the nettlesome
problem posed by the school district’s tri-ethnic makeup (white, black and Hispanic).416
“From the figures available to the court,” the Judge concluded, “it appears that no
school at any level will be ethnically identifiable.”417 In doing so, Seals continued, “this
plan has a realistic chance of creating a unitary school system,” one that caused no
“undue economic burden[s]” and would “not disrupt the educational process more than
[was] necessary to secure rights guaranteed under the Constitution.”418 The same
pattern was followed in Little Rock where, following Swann, 419 the Court ordered the
school board to create a new integration plan utilizing school pairing and grouping along
with mandatory busing so as to “destroy their [the individual schools] former racial
identifiability.”420 In Jefferson Parish Louisiana, Judge Christenberry, on motion from
plaintiffs seeking the application of the Swann decision to this case, ordered the school
board to draw up a new integration plan, one emphasizing school pairing and revised
geographical attendance zones.421 He also demanded that the plan must provide for
integration of faculty in such a manner that the racial ratio of the faculty in each school
match the ratio for the district as a whole. 422 Finally, on the troubling issue of busing,
the judge was less demanding, suggesting that “while busing is a permissible tool for
school desegregation, and undoubtedly will be necessary to some extent . . . busing
should be a last-resort remedy.”423

415

Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent Sch. Dist., 330 F. Supp 1377, 1397 (S.D. Tex.

1971).
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Id. at 1393-97.
Id. at 1393.
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Id. The court’s order was appealed to the Fifth Circuit which upheld the plan.
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972). However, a
stay of execution was ordered by Justice Black which delayed implementation. Cisneros, 404
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As Judge Christenberry’s orders on busing shows, not all judges embraced the idea
of mathematical ratios, system-wide school pairing and especially mandatory bussing.
Some agreed with the firm position of Judge William Taylor who, in the Dallas School
case, made clear that, “I am opposed to and do not believe in massive cross-town
bussing of students for the sole purpose of mixing bodies.”424 Many more could agree
with Judge Taylor that there were “many other tools at the command of the School
Board” to fight segregation than busing.425 Yet these alternate, and presumably less
intrusive, methods were also based, on the whole, in a race-based approach to
integration. One of the most popular methods for those wishing to minimize the need
for cross-town busing was the application of a majority to minority transfer system. An
outgrowth of the old freedom-of-choice plans of the early 1960s, and promoted by the
Fifth Circuit in its Jefferson426 decision, majority to minority plans involved allowing
students to transfer to any school they wished, so long as their race was in the minority
in the new school. 427 The idea was that the voluntary movement of students seeking a
better education by moving to new schools in which their race was in the minority
would provide the necessary push toward integration. Widely adopted as either the sole
method of integration or as a part of a wider integration plan,428 the problem with
majority to minority plans was that it placed the burden of desegregation largely on
minority students. (Experience showed that few whites would voluntarily transfer to a
black-majority school).429 These plans also had problems generating enough movement
to produce a unitary school system. As the Eight Circuit noted, “while it is true that the
majority to minority transfer provision has the potential for alleviating the situation to an
extent, it is in large part an illusory remedy.”430 Still, many judges liked the majority to
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Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d in part, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.

1975).
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Id. It should be noted that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Swann, Judge Taylor
did order limited bussing to achieve integration. Id. at 956. However, he continued in his
opposition toward school pairing in Dallas, feeling that the “[c]ontiguous pairing or grouping
of secondary level schools. . . [w]ould have only produced movement of white students from
one school to another or all Black students from one school to another” as a result of the
city’s segregated residential patterns. Id.
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United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F. 2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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A RMOR , supra note 58, at 162-63 (describing minority-to-majority transfer plans). For
an example of a Freedom-of-Choice plan in action, see ROBERT PRATT , THE COLOR OF THEIR
SKIN 40-55 (1992).
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A RMOR , supra note 58, at 167.
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In fact, experience showed that where freedom-of-choice type plans existed and
formerly all-white schools became increasingly integrated, “many white parents withdrew
their children from those schools and enrolled them in other white schools.” PRATT , supra
note 427, at 44. While majority to minority plans ended this practice, it did little to undermine
white reluctance to attend black majority schools (and hence, to promote white transfers to
black schools).
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Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1035, 1044 (8th Cir. 1970).
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Another popular approach, one usually proposed by those who wished to limit the
disruptions associated with integration (and one that was not based on a race-focused
application of the courts’ power) was the use of neighborhood schools. Under a
neighborhood plan, all students living in a residential neighborhood, irrespective of race,
would attend the same schools. Often paired with majority to minority efforts, such
plans had the advantage of familiarity and moderation. By minimizing the need for
busing, it was felt that these plans increased the chances of public (i.e. white)
acceptance and thus minimized the risks for white flight.432 Unfortunately, given the
prevalence of residential segregation, neighborhood school plans often failed to achieve
the goal of integration. This failure made such plans constitutionally suspect.433 “The
neighborhood school concept, no matter how attractive,” noted Judge Frank Kaufman
of the Maryland District Court, “cannot, at the elementary or any higher level, compel a
continued pattern of unconstitutional segregation.”434 The standard set by Green435
was effectiveness and only effectiveness: did the plan end bi-racial school systems and
did it do so “now.”436 If the method reinforced segregation rather than promoting
desegregation, then that method was unacceptable. 437 And while some judges were
willing to try neighborhood school plans, most were forced to the unavoidable
conclusion that such plans were not adequate remedies.438
The conclusion is clear. No matter what the particular views of the judge on the
issue of race mixing and mandatory busing, the application of group-based remedies
implicit in the receivership model made the shift to race based quota systems inevitable
if the goals set by the Supreme Court were to be met -- a position implicitly accepted by
the Supreme Court in its Swann439 ruling.440 And despite the constant hemming and
431

See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp 1249, 1251 (N.D. Ga . 1973).
See Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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Examples where judges denied plans for neighborhood schools as constitutionally
infirm include: Clark, 426 F. 2d at 1043; Cato v. Parham, 297 F. Supp. 403, 410 (E.D. Ark. 1969);
Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp 1034, 1035-36 (D. Md. 1972). It is interesting to note,
however, that the Supreme Court never embraced the model that residential segregation
resulting in dual school districts mandates such reactions as school busing. In fact, the High
Court “has never permitted the use of housing segregation as the sole basis for a school
desegregation remedy.” A RMOR , supra note 58, at 10.
434
Vaughns, 355 F. Supp at 1050.
435
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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hawing about only requiring “approximate” ratios, the plans that came out of the district
courts were based primarily on the application of race membership to school placement.
Even where the judge disliked the group oriented nature of such plans, they had few
options available if they were to fulfill their constitutional duty. Once the decision had
been made to apply the enforcement tools created to serve bankruptcy receiverships to
desegregation matters, the shift to “benign racial sorting” was soon to follow.
5. Conclusion
By 1974 the application of the receivership model to southern school desegregation
was largely complete. The years that followed would see a maturation of this practice,
both in terms of its shift to the North and in its continued application in the South.
Even in the face of Supreme Court indecision, and even retreat, on this issue, 441 the
general components of the receivership model (the retention of jurisdiction, the use of
experts, mandatory injunctions and sweeping decrees, and a general group-focus to
implemented remedies) remained strong. It simply was too useful a tool if any
integration were to be achieved. For, in applying the familiar components of the equity
receivership, district judges could overcome the practical dilemmas posed by popular
opposition to integration.
None of this is to say that the civil rights receivership was exactly the same as the
economic receiverships of the past; there were significant differences in focus and
scope between the two processes.442 However, the old model provided a template for
the new procedures, and with it, a conceptual framework that set outer parameters of
available action. More importantly, it gave judges a lead on how to handle the
overwhelming pressures that immediate integration posed. Once this “lead” was
discovered, judges experimented with the process in response to actual enforcement
difficulties. The result was both similar and different to that of earlier cases.
The effect of this use of traditional equity procedures was a radical expansion of the

supported
a district judge who had taken a courageous stand on what he thought to be the
implications of Green, [the justices] could not -- at least without provoking dissent - enjoy the district judge’s freedom to explain and justify the course the law was
taking. The opinions for the Supreme Court, in Swann and every major
desegregation case that followed, refused to acknowledge that the ‘rules of the
game’ had changed since Brown in any respect other than the timetable for
compliance.
They accordingly offered no justification for the different
constitutional rules that were now being enforced by the district courts.
KULL, supra note 4, at 196-97.
441
Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
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influence of the federal courts. From busing to orders for remedial education to
decrees for new construction and beyond, the impact was explosive. The federal
courts, notes Mark Chadsey in his recent study of the federal courts and southern
school desegregation, “played a significant . . . role . . . as the creators of nearly all
legal standards governing school desegregation.” In fact, “between 1969 and 1973, the
federal courts, acting alone, increased the number of desegregated black school children
to over 90 percent.”443 Thus, though other forces were at work promoting change
(Civil Rights Act of 1964, HEW), it was the federal courts that ultimately shaped the
desegregation process: setting standards, promoting methods, integrating the efforts of
other agencies, and ultimately, judging success or failure. And it was the district judges
who carried out most of this movement as they experimented to find answers to the
many practical issues raised by integration. In the process, these judges constructed a
set of enforcement procedures and methods which, once adopted, made the shift to a
group-based, results oriented jurisprudence in the schools and other civil rights matters,
if not inevitable, hard to stop. The result was the expansion of this new model of civil
rights across society, and with it, a revolution in rights whose effects are still felt today.
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